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Abstract 
Individuals’ epistemological understanding—that is, their beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge and knowing— is thought to have important implications for critical thinking 
in both formal and informal learning contexts (Burr & Hofer, 2002; Council of Chief 
State School Officers, 2014; Kuhn, 1999; NGSS Lead States, 2013). Indeed, our 
epistemological beliefs are thought to influence the questions we ask, the sources of 
information we place trust in, the certainty of our beliefs, and even academic outcomes 
(Greene, Sandoval, & Bråten, 2016a). However, most of the literature describes the 
developmental patterns of epistemological understanding in adolescence and adulthood, 
without characterizing the cause-effect mechanisms at play, particularly those in 
childhood. Although there is observational evidence suggesting that parent-child 
interactions are a context in which epistemological understanding may develop (Luce, 
Callanan, & Smilovic, 2013), and parent epistemological beliefs have been found to 
predict children’s critical evaluations of speakers who reason about evidence with 
varying competence (Suárez & Koenig, accepted), the role of adult influences on 
children’s epistemological development has not been examined experimentally. In the 
present study, I investigate: 1) How children develop the ability to consider the nature of 
knowledge within the context of conversation; 2) Whether improved epistemological 
understanding supports children’s critical thinking in informal social learning; 3) 
Whether cognitive self-control and verbal IQ moderate or mediate epistemological 
development; and 4) Whether individual differences in epistemological understanding 
relate to parent characteristics. 
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Part I: Introduction 
 
What is knowledge? How can we be sure that our knowledge reflects truth? Is 
truth even knowable? These are just some of the questions that characterize 
epistemology, or the branch of philosophy focused on understanding the nature of 
knowledge, how we come to have knowledge, and how we justify or evaluate our 
knowledge (Steup, 2005).  Ancient traditions in epistemology can be traced to western 
scholars like Plato and Socrates (Goldman, 1986; Plochmann, 1976), as well as to various 
ancient eastern philosophies including Buddhism, Confucianism and Brahmanism 
(Ganeri, 2007; Hayes, 2006; Hetherington & Lai, 2012; Tweed & Lehman, 2002).  
However, in the 21st century epistemological questions about how to promote 
discernment between fact from opinion, truth from deception, and dogma from 
empiricism have dominated our national conversation to such an extent that terms like 
“alternative facts”, “post-truth world” and “fake news” have quickly become a part of our 
cultural lexicon (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017). In recent years, age-old 
epistemological questions about how to promote discernment between fact from opinion, 
truth from deception, and dogma from empiricism have motivated a call for educators to 
prioritize developing their students’ epistemological understanding (Council of Chief 
State School Officers, 2014; Kuhn & Shaughnessy, 2018; NGSS Lead States, 2013; Paul, 
2017; Rider & Peters, 2018). Why the concern? Individuals’ beliefs about knowing and 
knowledge may have important implications for their day-to-day critical thinking and 
learning. Specifically, our epistemological views are thought to influence the questions 
we ask, the sources of information we place trust in, our certainty in what we believe, and 
so on (Burr & Hofer, 2002; Greene, Cartiff, & Duke, 2018; National Education 
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Association, 2012). Further compounding these concerns is research pointing to a lack of 
understanding among the general public about the nature of science, how to reconcile 
conflicting information, how to critically evaluate sources of information for their 
reliability, and how to make sense of complex information (Greene & Yu, 2014; Kuhn, 
2016; Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014). 
In part as a response to these growing concerns, there has been an explosion in 
research on this topic within the past two decades (Greene et al., 2018; Greene, Sandoval, 
& Bråten, 2016b). This work has primarily been conducted in various branches of 
philosophy, psychology, and education, and tends to focus on one of four overarching 
topics: (1) the developmental trajectory of epistemological understanding; (2) the 
dimensions of epistemological beliefs; (3) how individual differences in epistemological 
understanding predict various developmental, academic, and teaching outcomes; and (4) 
the mechanisms of change underlying epistemological development. All four of these 
areas of research have played an important role in informing and motivating the current 
study.  
In Part I of this manuscript, I review the literature that motivates and informs the 
current study. Specifically, in Chapter 1, I discuss the predominant theoretical 
frameworks on epistemological understanding, drawing particular attention to their major 
contributions and limitations. In Chapter 2, I offer an overview of developmental research 
indicating that there are important epistemological developments occurring early in life. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss individual differences in adolescents’ and adults’ epistemological 
understanding, as well as their predictive relation with various academic, social, 
developmental, and cognitive outcomes. In Chapter 4, I address important theoretical and 
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methodological questions concerning the mechanisms of epistemological development 
and the widespread (mis)use of correlational evidence. 
4 
Chapter 1: Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations 
In this chapter, I discuss the predominant theoretical frameworks on 
epistemological understanding, drawing particular attention to their major contributions 
and limitations. 
Typology and Terminology. Prominent Theoretical Frameworks. I begin first 
by clarifying pertinent, but potentially confusing, terminology and its relation with 
certain research traditions and schools of thought. As Greene, et al. (2016a) have noted, 
the study of personal epistemology is not a single, coherent field. Rather, the fields of 
philosophy, educational and developmental psychology, and education have all 
contributed their own discoveries, traditions, terminology, and frameworks to the study of 
epistemological understanding. These are mutually informative, yet fragmented. This 
fragmentation is perhaps most evident when we examine the array of terms used to refer 
to the study of individuals’ epistemological understanding: personal epistemology (Burr 
& Hofer, 2002; Hammer & Elby, 2002), epistemological beliefs (Jehng, Johnson, & 
Anderson, 1993; Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Kardash & Howell, 2000; Qian & 
Alvermann, 1995; Schommer, 1990; Schommer, 1998; Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes, 
1992), reflective judgment (King & Kitchener, 2004; KS Kitchener, 1986; KS Kitchener 
& King, 1981; KS Kitchener, Lynch, Fischer, & Wood, 1993), ways of knowing 
(Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) (Bang, 2015; Clinchy, 1995), 
epistemological reflection (Baxter Magolda, 2004), epistemological theories (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997), epistemic beliefs ((Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; Bendixen, Schraw, & 
Dunkle, 1998a),  folk epistemology (R. F. Kitchener, 2002), and epistemological 
resources (Hammer & Elby, 2002).  
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For example, the term “personal epistemology”, first originating from Piagetian 
constructivist traditions (e.g. Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000) but adopted more 
broadly, approximately refers to the same phenomena that others refer to as “epistemic 
cognition” (e.g. King & Kitchener, 2004). These terms offer different shades of meaning, 
reflecting nuanced emphases on individuals’ more general epistemological beliefs, versus 
the processes by which individuals actively reason about epistemological phenomena 
(Greene & Yu, 2014; Karen Strohm Kitchener, 1983). Similarly, the terms “naïve 
epistemology” and “folk epistemology”, most often seen in developmental psychology 
literature (R. F. Kitchener, 2002; e.g. Montgomery, 1992), fall most closely in line with 
the term “personal epistemology” in that they typically refer to an individual’s everyday 
beliefs about epistemological phenomena. It should be noted that I use “epistemological 
understanding” as an umbrella term referring to epistemological concepts, processes 
and/or practices. 
Existing frameworks can be roughly classified into two groups: developmental 
models and dimensional models. That is, predominant models tend to focus mostly on 
either the developmental trajectory or specific features of individuals’ epistemological 
understanding. However, it should be noted that these models are not mutually exclusive, 
and indeed there are examples of frameworks that are both. Further complicating matters 
is that within and across these various frameworks, researchers’ work may be reflective 
of constructivist approaches, sociocultural approaches, traditions in naturalized 
epistemology, traditions in social epistemology, and any combination of these. 
Naturalistic epistemology is an approach to developing theoretical frameworks on 
epistemic cognition in which adherents have moved away from engaging in a priori 
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theorizing (Goldman, 1994; R. F. Kitchener, 1993; Kitcher & Schmitt, 1994; Kornblith, 
1985; Quine, 1969). Instead, empirical findings from the cognitive and educational 
sciences drive the conception and development of theories, models, and frameworks. This 
approach often overlaps substantially with the approach known as social epistemology 
(Fuller, 2002), or the study of how knowledge is constructed, substantiated, and 
communicated within and between social groups. For example, a social epistemologist 
might be interested in studying how the scientific community adheres to specific 
epistemic practices to make and disseminate knowledge, such as dissertation defenses, 
reliability coding, or peer review. 
Developmental Models. Developmental models of personal epistemology 
represent some of the earliest and most influential theoretical frameworks on the topic. 
Along with dimensional models, they dominate the literature and continue to be 
referenced and utilized in various disciplines of study. Many of these developmental 
models, particularly the earliest ones, are clearly influenced by Piaget’s (1972) stage 
theory of development, as well as his emphasis on individuals’ role in their own 
knowledge construction, termed “genetic epistemology”. Thus, the Neo-Piagetian 
frameworks reviewed here reflect constructivist views of knowledge as a series of 
“conceptual structures that epistemic agents, given the range of present experience within 
their tradition of thought and language, consider viable” (von Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 124). 
Such is the case with Perry’s (1970) classic study of the changes in “intellectual 
and moral development” among college students. His longitudinal and cross-sectional 
observations of male Harvard undergraduates focused on how students understand 
knowledge, how their ideas about "knowing" changed, and the ways in which these 
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perspectives related to their learning and reasoning more generally. Reminiscent of 
Piagetian theories of development, Perry proposed that college students’ epistemological 
growth involved passing through an invariable sequence of nine stages. Learners, Perry 
posited, begin with the view that truth is absolute, and beliefs are either right or wrong. 
These less sophisticated epistemological views hold that Right or Wrong beliefs are 
obtained from “Good” or “Bad” authorities. As learners develop, they become 
increasingly able to recognize that multiple, sometimes conflicting versions of “truth” 
may simultaneously have at least some degree of legitimacy. This relativist epistemology 
is particularly sophisticated because it holds that beliefs can be justified with reason, and 
that as new reasons emerge, epistemic commitments evolve. Thus, according to this 
framework, epistemological development is characterized by a movement toward 
relativist viewpoints that are justified by reason rather than authority. Perry’s framework 
became widely popular in part because it speaks to epistemological issues underlying 
critical thinking, leading many to adopt curricula informed by this framework with the 
goal of supporting students’ critical thinking (Moore, 1994; e.g. Moore, 1981). However, 
Perry himself clarified that his intent was to produce “a purely descriptive formulation of 
students’ experience,” rather than a “prescriptive program intended to ‘get’ students to 
develop” (Perry & Chickering, 1981, p. 107). Perry’s caution was prudent given the two 
major limitations in his work: first, that it was developed based on data from non-
representative samples; and second, that it focused on the trajectory, rather than the 
mechanisms, of epistemological development. 
Likewise in the Neo-Piagetian vein were Kitchener and King (K.S. Kitchener, 
1977; KS Kitchener, 1983; KS Kitchener & King, 1981), who proposed a constructivist 
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model of epistemic cognition which increasingly reflected traditions in naturalized 
epistemology over the years (King & KS Kitchener, 2004). Their “reflective judgment 
model” proposed seven stages of post-adolescent reasoning styles which were 
summarized into three levels: pre-reflective reasoning (stages 1-3), quasi-reflective 
reasoning (stages 4 and 5), and reflective reasoning (stages 6 and 7).  Pre-reflective 
reasoning maintains that knowledge is gained through the word of an authority figure or 
firsthand observation; quasi-reflective reasoning regards knowledge claims as containing 
elements of uncertainty, and views judgments as idiosyncratic; and reflective reasoning 
(stages 6 and 7) recognizes that knowledge is actively constructed and re-constructed, 
contending that claims must be evaluated based on the context, evidence and reasoning 
processes used to generate them.  
Kitchener and King (1981) also posited that epistemic assumptions influence how 
individuals understand the nature of problems and decide what types of strategies are 
appropriate for solving them, particularly when facing what John Dewey described as ill-
structured problems (1938; 1933). Over 15 years’ of cross-sectional and longitudinal 
research, a 3-level model of cognitive processing was proposed and refined to account for 
these developments (King & KS Kitchener, 2004; KS Kitchener, 1983). At the first 
level—cognition—individuals compute, memorize, read, perceive, and solve problems. 
At the second level—metacognition—individuals monitor their own progress when they 
are engaged in these first-order tasks. At the third level—epistemic cognition—
individuals reflect on the limits, certainty, and conditions of knowing.  
Notably, this work is a reaction to Piaget’s claims that formal operations are the 
pinnacle of intellectual development (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; R.F. Kitchener, 1993). 
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Although cognitive and metacognitive processes appear to develop in early to middle 
childhood, research on adult reasoning suggests that epistemic cognitive monitoring 
develops in the late adolescent and adult years (King & KS Kitchener, 2004; KS 
Kitchener, 1986; KS Kitchener et al., 1993). Indeed, many Neo-Piagetian researchers 
have contended that formal operations are an inadequate account of the cognitive abilities 
of adults (Basseches, 1984; Fischer, 1980; Kuhn, 1989; Richards & Commons, 1990). 
Despite a firm basis in developmental evidence, the reflective judgment model has not 
escaped criticism. As Kurfiss (1988) notes, King, KS Kitchener, R.F. Kitchener (e.g. KS 
Kitchener & King, 1981), and other Neo-Piagetian theorists make deterministic, 
integrative assumptions of stage models. In contrast Kurfiss (1988) recommends using 
the terms “position” and “perspective” to describe epistemological judgments. Similarly, 
Dannefer (1984) notes that developmental theories may fall into the trap of ontogenetic 
reductionism, or the practice of treating socially produced and patterned phenomena as 
rooted in the characteristics of the individual organism. 
Consequently, Kuhn and colleagues produced their own developmental model of 
epistemological understanding (Kuhn et al., 2000). Kuhn, an educational psychologist 
with research interests rooted in the development of informal and scientific reasoning 
(Kuhn, 1977, 1991; Kuhn & Angelev, 1976; Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, & Haan, 1977; 
Kuhn & Phelps, 1982), also reflects Neo-Piagetian constructivist traditions in a stage-like 
model of epistemological development. According to this framework, what lies at the 
heart of mature epistemological understanding is the coordination of the subjective and 
objective dimensions of knowing. Initially, the objective dimension dominates, and 
subjectivity is excluded. In this absolutist view, assertions are judged to be either right or 
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wrong, and truth is seen as theoretically knowable. Further, the absolutist learner may see 
truth as defined by an authority such as scientists, parents, teachers, or even God. 
Subsequently in development, when multiplist perspectives appear, the subjective 
dimension dominates and the objective is abandoned. In this stage, assertions are judged 
as neither right nor wrong, and truth is viewed as ultimately unknowable. Finally, the two 
dimensions of knowledge are coordinated and evaluativist judgments are made. In this 
view, assertions can be evaluated by weighing them against evidence, and through this 
process truth can be approximated. This way of thinking is most like scientific reasoning.  
To be clear, individuals who accept information from an authority are not 
necessarily reflecting an absolutist perspective. Consider how someone may choose to 
believe that vaccines do not cause autism after reading a press release from the American 
Medical Association. An absolutist judgment would involve deeming this as an objective 
and certain truth, external to the human mind and fixed by authority such as God, 
WebMD, or the American Medical Association. An evaluativist judgment, on the other 
hand, would involve believing that vaccinations do not cause autism because thousands 
of doctors and researchers, fallible as they may be, have collectively deemed it to be true 
based on years of well-collected evidence and sound reasoning. Thus, absolutists and 
evaluativists may make similar judgments about what is true, certain, or reliable, but are 
motivated by different epistemological beliefs and reasoning. 
Departing further from Perry’s (1970) framework, Kuhn and colleagues (2000) 
describe how this developmental progression in epistemological perspectives typically 
occurs in a systematic order across different judgment domains: subjectivity is first and 
most readily acknowledged in personal taste and aesthetic judgments and least readily in 
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judgments about the physical world. Once subjectivity is accepted and becomes 
dominant, objectivity is reintegrated in the reverse order (i.e., most readily with respect to 
judgments about the physical world and least readily with respect to aesthetic judgments). 
They also report that for a meaningful subset of individuals, both transitions proved most 
difficult in the values domain. Kuhn’s model also departs from Perry’s (1970) because it 
is based on a sample with a diverse range of educational attainment and domains of 
expertise. In part because of this diversity, Kuhn and colleagues’ (2000) model succeeds 
in going beyond describing developmental trajectories by suggesting mechanisms of 
epistemological development: findings indicate that individuals are more likely to 
develop evaluativist epistemological beliefs over the course of development, particularly 
in domains of their expertise. That is, in addition to “maturation”, Kuhn and colleagues 
(2000) posit that developing expertise in an area of study is at least one way in which 
experiences help promote epistemological development. 
In more recent years, developmental models influenced by traditions in 
sociocultural psychology, naturalized epistemology, and social epistemology have 
emerged. In keeping with Vygotskyan traditions (Vygotsky, 1962, 1978a), these models 
draw particular attention to the social and cultural processes that contribute to 
epistemological development, characterizing epistemological beliefs and reasoning as 
context-dependent. In this view, epistemological beliefs are cultural products and 
epistemological reasoning is a cultural activity. Sometimes referred to as epistemological 
resource models, these frameworks attempt to account for how contextual factors 
influence individual knowledge construction, including individuals’ ideas about 
knowledge and knowing (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hammer & Elby, 2002; Muis & 
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Franco, 2009). For example, Chinn and colleagues’ (2011) epistemological resource 
model characterizes twenty-six processes of epistemic cognition based on the epistemic 
aims that an individual might pursue during a given activity, how those aims relate to 
non-epistemic aims, and how aims are related to reliable processes of knowledge 
development. These reliable processes include social practices developed within 
particular communities to solve specific epistemic problems (Chinn et al., 2011). 
Bang and Medin’s (2010a) take on epistemological resource models focuses on 
the ways in which forms of human–nature relations shape the cultural practices that 
impact knowledge, reasoning, and learning about, in, and with the natural world (Bang, 
2015; Lee, 2008; Medin & Bang, 2014b; Rogoff, Paradise, Arauz, Correa-Chávez, & 
Angelillo, 2003). Bang and Medin (2010a) have broadly referred to this orientation as 
“relational epistemologies”, and seek to characterize the culturally specific ways in which 
learning unfolds, particularly in the context of outdoor practices. This framework 
describes various mechanisms by which epistemological understanding can be 
enculturated throughout development, including family and cultural practices such as 
nature walks. 
Dimensional Models. In addition to developmental models of epistemological 
understanding, dimensional models are highly popular in the literature. These models 
focus on characterizing people’s views of knowledge and knowing in terms of multiple 
types of beliefs or theories, which can change independently from one another. 
Furthermore, unlike most developmental models, which posit that beliefs change in a 
systematic way, dimensional models tend to hold that epistemological development is 
less systematic and more variable across individuals.  
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The arrival of Schommer’s (1990) dimensional model represented a major shift in 
the theoretical conceptualization of personal epistemology. Where developmental models 
held that epistemological beliefs change in a systematic way (e.g. absolutists hold that 
knowledge is both simple and externally sourced), Schommer (1990) argued that this 
might not always be the case (e.g. individuals could hold that beliefs are complex and 
externally sourced).  Schommer’s model was comprised of multiple, somewhat 
independent, belief dimensions on which individuals might vary. Each dimension lies 
along a continuum representing a degree of epistemological naiveté or sophistication, and 
more sophisticated beliefs are associated with better performance on academic and 
learning outcomes. The terms used to refer to dimensions have changed somewhat over 
time, but are most commonly referred to as simple knowledge, certain knowledge, source 
of knowledge, ability to learn, and quick learning (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Some have 
argued that the ability to learn and quick learning are not truly epistemic in nature, but 
rather concern beliefs about learning (Greene, Azevedo, & Torney-Purta, 2008; Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Sandoval, 2009). What is not disputed, however, is that one of 
Schommer’s major contributions to the field was the development of an instrument for 
measuring epistemic beliefs. Schommer’s self-report epistemological questionnaire (EQ), 
which produced quantifiable scores measuring epistemological sophistication across 
different dimensions, brought about an explosion of empirical work on epistemic 
cognition along with different variants of the EQ (e.g. C. A. M. Kardash & Scholes, 
1996; Marlene Schommer, 1993; Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003). 
The EQ was developed partly out of an interest in finding links between epistemological 
understanding and academic outcomes, as we will review in later sections of this paper. 
14 
Although Schommer (1990)  has been hugely influential in the study of 
epistemological understanding, it should be noted that this approach is not particularly 
concerned with the mechanisms by which individual differences in epistemological 
beliefs develop. Thus, it can be placed squarely in the category of dimensional, rather 
than developmental, frameworks. This lies in contrast to Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) 
epistemological theories model, which was born from their efforts to review and find 
coherence between developmental and dimensional models of epistemic cognition.  
Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) epistemological theories model holds that 
epistemological beliefs are comprised of four somewhat independent dimensions, or 
“personal theories”: simple knowledge, certain knowledge, source of knowledge, and 
justification of knowledge. They classified the first two dimensions as beliefs about the 
nature of knowledge, and the latter two as beliefs about the nature of knowing. 
Borrowing Piagetian terminology, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) posited that change along 
these dimensions might be due to cognitive disequilibrium, but pointed to models of 
conceptual change (Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) and sociocultural 
enculturation (Vygotsky, 1978b) as additional influences for their model of 
epistemological development. Thus, their effort to postulate mechanisms of 
epistemological development was not only an attempt to reconcile developmental and 
dimensional models, but also to syncretize both constructivist and sociocultural traditions 
in developmental psychology. Another of Hofer and colleagues’ major contributions to 
the field was the insistence that the trajectory of epistemological development be 
expanded to include younger children, in sharp contrast to most theorists who either 
posited that epistemological understanding does not emerge until adolescence, or ignored 
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the question of childhood epistemological understanding altogether (Burr & Hofer, 
2002). 
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Chapter 2: The Development of Epistemological Understanding 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, some of the most prominent theoretical models of 
epistemological understanding focus primarily or entirely on adolescent and adult 
populations. However, there is an abundance of research on the earliest forms of 
epistemological understanding from cognitive developmental traditions. In this chapter, I 
offer an overview of developmental research indicating that there are important 
epistemological developments occurring early in life.  I begin with a review of the 
research characterizing the socio-cognitive developments that underlie early 
epistemological understanding. These include “theory of mind”, or an awareness of 
others’ minds (Astington, 1993; Carlson, Koenig, & Harms, 2013), and metacognition, 
which can be broadly defined as cognition about cognition (e.g. thinking about thinking, 
knowing about knowing, etc.; Flavell, 1979; Papaleontiou-Louca, 2008). Furthermore, I 
point to existing research that describes how children employ their epistemological 
understanding to make sense of controversies, evaluate sources of information, and make 
learning decisions accordingly. Finally, I discuss early epistemological development as it 
occurs within specific social and cultural contexts. 
The Origins of Epistemological Understanding. There is a case to be made that 
the developmental precursors of epistemological understanding lie in infancy, as 
evidenced by the early behaviors involved in information exchange. For example, infants 
are able to follow a person's pointing gesture and check back if there was no obvious 
target for the point or gaze, suggesting that they attribute knowledge and communicative 
intent to the pointer (Butterworth, 1991). Moreover, 10- to 13-month old infants from 
different cultures point towards objects declaratively, and check others’ gaze before and 
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after pointing (Liszkowski, et al., 2004; Callaghan, et al., 2011). Twelve-month-olds will 
often “answer” an ignorant adult’s question about the location of an object with a point 
(Behne, Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2012). However, there has been much 
debate about how to interpret these early gestures, and whether infants recognize the role 
of attention and perception in knowledge acquisition (Baron-Cohen, 1993; C. Moore, 
1996). 
Evidence of a dawning epistemological understanding is less ambiguous in 
toddlerhood. For example, 18-month-olds use the direction of a speaker's points and gaze 
to infer the referent of a novel word (Baldwin, 1996, 2000), and young 2-year-olds can 
adjust their requests for assistance based on a person's knowledge state, giving more 
information to someone who is ignorant of the situation (O’Neill, 1996). Furthermore, 
infants and preschoolers alike appreciate the effects of informational access on resultant 
beliefs (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O’neill, Astington, & Flavell, 1992; O’Neill & Chong, 
2001; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) (O’neill & Gopnik, 1991; Pillow, 1989; Pratt & 
Bryant, 1990; H. M. Wellman & Bartsch, 1989; Zaitchik, 1991).  
The theory of mind literature thoroughly documents young children’s developing 
understanding of others’ mental states, such as attention, desire, pretense, imagination, 
belief, and so on, as they develop within the first 5 years of life (Perner, 1991a; 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; H. M. Wellman, 2015). For example, 
3-year-olds display some awareness of themselves and others as knowers, distinguish 
thinking about an object from actually perceiving it, and begin to refer to their own 
knowledge states using verbs such as think and know (Flavell, 1999). By age 4, they fully 
differentiate between the non-factive think and factive know (Dudley, 2018). That is, they 
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appreciate that the term know refers to a belief that is both true and well justified (as 
opposed to a belief that just happens to be true), whereas think needn’t be either (for a 
comprehensive review on young children’s concept of knowledge, see Ronfard, Bartz, 
Cheng, Chen, & Harris, 2017).  Four-year-olds can also attribute false beliefs to 
themselves and others (e.g. Astington, Pelletier, & Homer, 2002; Gopnik & Wellman, 
1994; Harris, 1994; Leslie, 1994; Perner, 1991b; B. Wellman & Wortley, 1990). Indeed, 
the understanding of “false belief”, or the ability to make a distinction between what is 
true and what others believe to be true, is a major developmental milestone in children’s 
epistemological development. 
An examination of young children’s epistemological understanding in a more 
naturalistic context provides further evidence of naive epistemological beliefs and 
reasoning (Walton, 2000). A study of transcripts from spontaneous classroom arguments 
(grades K-4) revealed that nearly 18% of classroom utterances during class contained 
epistemological expressions, with the proportion increasing with age (REF?). About one 
third of the children's epistemological expressions concerned certainty, and contrasted 
knowledge with belief.  Epistemological expressions were used strategically to moderate 
discussion, but this functioned differently in the talk of children as compared to teachers. 
Where children used expressions of uncertainty to soften challenges, teachers used the 
same expressions to make indirect threats and commands. Older children were more 
likely to discuss cognitive processes (i.e. selective attention) and the veracity of claims 
(REF?). Thus, not only do individual children have a developing set of epistemological 
concepts and reasoning skills, but they also employ a shared epistemological 
understanding to negotiate meaning in everyday interactions. 
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However, as Koenig (2002) and Wimmer and Gschaider (2000) point out, most 
research on children’s theory of knowledge beyond false belief— including their early-
developing notions about the certainty, epistemic source, and justification of belief—has 
received comparatively less attention. Rather than treating false belief understanding as 
the crowning achievement of theory of mind development, it has been argued that it 
precedes another important milestone: the emergence of an interpretive theory of mind 
(H. M. Wellman, 1992). That is, children begin to appreciate how others’ beliefs are 
actively constructed and subject to bias, misinterpretation, and revision (H. M. Wellman 
& Hickling, 1994). Along these lines, Gopnik and Meltzoff (2006) maintain that by age 5 
years, children understand that a person's beliefs are not faithful and immutable 
recordings of the world, but rather active interpretations or construals of the world from a 
given perspective. As Chandler and Lalonde (1998) have noted, an interpretive theory of 
mind does not automatically emerge as a consequence of false belief understanding (see 
also Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). Instead, children first develop a “Copy Theory of 
Mind” whereby the mind is seen as a device that records either faithful or flawed 
representations of reality. It is the later-developing “Interpretive Theory of Mind” that 
allows children to recognize and appreciate the human mind’s capacity for constructively 
interpreting (or misinterpreting) reality.  
Much of the research on children’s interpretive —indeed, constructivist— theory 
of mind examines developing concepts about their own and others’ learning and 
reasoning processes. For example, between the ages of 3 and 5, preschoolers become 
increasingly able to articulate how they and others learn: younger preschoolers 
characterize learning primarily in terms of perceptual access and information-gathering 
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behaviors, but older preschoolers display an explicit metacognitive understanding of the 
relations between actions and knowledge-construction (Sobel & Letourneau, 2015, 2018). 
Despite this, children do not recognize inference as a source of knowledge until about age 
6, even if the salience of information justifying a deductive inference is heightened 
(Keenan, Ruffman, & Olson, 1994; Pillow, 1999; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987). However, by 
the early school years children appear to recognize and understand various nuanced 
aspects of other’s reasoning and knowledge-construction. For example, school-aged 
children acknowledge the existence of processes like selective attention, interpretation 
and various forms of inferential reasoning (Amsterlaw, 2006; Pillow, 2008), and 
recognize that inferential reasoning results in new or revised epistemic states (Pillow, 
1989, 2012; Pillow & Henrichon, 1996).  
Sodian, Zaitchik, and Carey (1991) found that 6- and 7-year-old children 
differentiate hypothetical beliefs from evidence, differentiate between conclusive and 
inconclusive tests, understand that inferences can be made from the outcome of a 
conclusive test, and understand that inferences made from inconclusive tests are 
unwarranted. Furthermore, 6-year-olds seem to value the practical function of reasoning, 
and judge reasoning as a better way to solve problems than arbitrary methods like 
flipping a coin (Amsterlaw, 2006). Although 6-year-olds do recognize and appreciate the 
importance and function of reasoning, their constructivist theory of mind is still 
developing, particularly with regards to their understanding of the conditions that 
influence the certainty of knowledge. For example, Pillow and colleagues (2000) found 
that it is not until fourth grade that children rate conclusions derived from valid 
inferences as more certain than that those derived from guesses or invalid inferences. 
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Pillow (2002) also found that only adults differentiated between the certainty of others’ 
deductive and inductive inferences (although it should be noted that adolescents were not 
studied). 
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the development of 
scientific thinking, Koerber and colleagues (2014) conducted a fascinating cross-sectional 
study on the development of scientific thinking in elementary school (operationalized as 
the abilities to engage in experimental design, data interpretation, and understanding the 
nature of science). Item response theory analyses suggested that the multiple components 
of scientific thinking develop as a unitary construct independent of children’s verbal 
knowledge and reasoning skills, schooling, and parents’ science education. 
Children's Epistemological Judgments. Further informing our understanding of 
epistemological development is research examining children’s judgments about specific 
problems or people. Studies on children’s objectivism, or tendency to believe that there is 
a fixed, objective truth (i.e., what Kuhn, et al. would refer to as “absolutism” 2000), 
suggest that younger children are more likely than older children to make objectivist 
judgments. For example, with age children are less likely to say that only one person can 
be right, and more likely to report that it is acceptable for others to disagree with them 
(Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, & Banaji, 2013; Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, & Lewis, 
2004; Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998; Wright, 2012). 
Mansfield and Clinchy (2002) conducted a longitudinal study on the development 
of explicit epistemological judgments in which children were interviewed at ages 10, 13, 
and 16. They presented children with vignettes in which two characters disagree about 
issues ranging from immediately resolvable questions of fact to potentially unresolvable 
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matters of taste or value. The protagonists did not justify their views, and the vignettes 
did not contain enough information for the children to resolve the issues themselves. 
Experimenters asked participants a range of questions probing at their epistemological 
understanding, such as why the protagonists disagreed, who could be right, whether the 
dispute could be resolved, and (if so) how it could be resolved. Over time, children 
displayed an increasing awareness of the complexity of both the outer world of objective 
“reality” and the inner worlds of individual “knowers”. Furthermore, they demonstrated 
an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the ways in which inner and outer worlds 
intersect in the creation of knowledge. As children developed, their representations of 
“fact” and “opinion” became less sharply differentiated, and the phenomenon of knowing 
was understood to be less reactive and more constructive. For example, when asked about 
whether an unfamiliar animal would make a good pet, a 10-year-old participant indicated 
that she would need to ask a zookeeper to know the answer. At age 13, the same 
participant indicated that “there is no right or wrong [answer]” to the question of whether 
it would make a good or bad pet, because it was a matter of personal taste that cannot 
really be resolved. By age 16, she had judged the issue to be neither subjective nor 
objective, but “kind of in the middle”. She again recommended asking the zookeeper 
about whether the animal could be domesticated to determine whether or not it would 
make a good pet, but also indicated that one must take into account the kind of person 
who might not need a pet that is fully domesticated. 
However, even young children can depart from strictly objectivist judgments. For 
example, they can differentiate fact from opinion (Banerjee et al., 2007), with children as 
young as three judging that conflicting claims are more acceptable in the case of opinions 
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than factual beliefs (Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Moses, 1990). Furthermore, although 
Kuhn’s (2000) work would indicate that young children are inflexibly objectivist in the 
domain of moral beliefs, findings from Heiphetz and Young (2017) suggest that even 
preschoolers are capable of nuanced epistemological judgments in the moral domain. 
Specifically, they found that both preschoolers and adults were more likely to judge that 
only one person could be right in the case of a widely-held, rather than controversial, 
moral belief. Therefore, preschoolers view controversial beliefs as more subjective and 
less fact-like. However, regardless of the scenario, children were more likely than adults 
to say that only one person could be right in a moral disagreement. Adults were also more 
likely than children to prefer an individual who shared their controversial moral beliefs 
(e.g. that it is “ok” to tell a white lie). 
Research from the testimonial learning literature provides further insight into 
children’s epistemological development. Specifically, it suggests that children recruit 
their epistemological understanding to evaluate the reliability of information and its 
sources, as well as guide their own learning accordingly. Notably, children’s 
understanding about other people influences what they choose to learn from them, 
including their decisions to endorse, disbelieve, or remain agnostic about others’ claims 
(Banaji & Gelman, 2013; Heyman, 2008; Mills, 2013; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013; for 
reviews and discussion, see Stephens, Suarez, & Koenig, 2015). This work reveals that 
children prefer learning new information from relatively accurate and knowledgeable 
speakers (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Einav & Robinson, 2011; M. Koenig & 
Woodward, 2012; Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007; Scofield & Behrend, 2008); privilege informant 
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reliability over age or familiarity as a cue to guide their novel word learning (Corriveau, 
Meints, & Harris, 2009; Jaswal & Neely, 2006), prefer to learn from experts (Koenig & 
Jaswal, 2011; Kushnir, Vredenburgh, & Schneider, 2013; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001), and 
selectively trust informants on the basis of their statement generality and verifiability 
(Koenig et al., 2015).  
This literature also provides ample evidence that children recruit their 
“interpretive theory of mind” for testimonial learning. That is, preschoolers’ evaluations 
of informants are based on more than their history of accuracy or stated expertise— they 
also consider the manner in which an informant’s knowledge is acquired or justified 
(Koenig & Stephens, 2014). For example, preschoolers forgive an informant’s prior 
inaccuracies if they were due to inadequate perceptual access to information (Brosseau-
Liard & Birch, 2011; Nurmsoo, Einav, & Hood, n.d.). Furthermore, preschool-aged 
readers treat someone with access to print information as reliable, but no longer trust that 
informant when access to print is removed (Einav & Robinson, 2011). Four-year-olds 
even distinguish between truly knowledgeable informants and merely accurate 
informants, seeking novel information from an informant who had previously given 
answers unaided rather than from an informant who had relied on help from a third party 
(Einav & Robinson, 2010). 
Children also evaluate agents based on certain logical properties of their 
reasoning. Mercier, Bernard and Clément (2014) found that children as young as 3 
favored agents who produced non-circular, rather than circular, arguments for their 
conclusions (e.g. “The dog went this way because I’ve seen him go in this direction” vs. 
“The dog went this way because he went in this direction”). Similarly, Corriveau and 
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Kurkul (2014) found that 3- and 5-year olds preferred learning novel explanations—and 
in the case of 5-year-olds, novel labels—from an informant who had previously provided 
noncircular, rather circular, explanations. Castelain, Bernard, Van der Henst & Mercier 
(n.d.) even found that 4- to 6-year-olds from traditional Mayan communities recognize an 
evidence-based argument made by a socially subordinate agent as better than a circular 
argument made by a dominant agent. Furthermore, Doebel, Rowell and Koenig (Doebel, 
Rowell, & Koenig, 2016) found that 4- and 5-year-old children judged agent’s 
conceptually inconsistent statements (e.g., “this is both the smallest ball and the largest 
ball”) as ‘not making sense;’ and by age 5, children selectively learned from logically 
consistent informants.  
In addition to evaluating logical properties of speaker statements, children can 
evaluate reasoners based their use evidence to draw conclusions. When Koenig (2012) 
compared speakers who cited good epistemic reasons for their claims (such as prior 
perceptual access) with to speakers who offered poor reasons (such as desiring, 
pretending, or guessing something to be true), 3- and 4-year olds not only make 
appropriate judgments about what counts as a good reason for belief, but also 
preferentially sought and endorsed information from the informant they had judged to 
have “the best way of thinking”. Subsequently, Suárez and Koenig (accepted) presented 
children with reasoners who varied in whether they sought readily available information 
and provided an appropriate justification for their conclusions. The 4-, 5- and 6-year-
olds—who were procedurally required to infer or estimate the truth of a speaker’s 
conclusion— attributed knowledge to those who made sound inferences by gathering and 
citing evidence, and also endorsed their conclusions. In contrast, 6-year-olds, and in some 
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cases even 5-year-olds, did not systematically attribute knowledge to speakers who made 
unsound inferences or guesses. Furthermore, 6-year-olds refrained from systematically 
endorsing the conclusions of poor reasoners. Suárez and Koenig (accepted) also explored 
individual differences in children’s judgments about reasoners who differed in their 
sensitivity to the strength of statistical evidence. By age 6, children were more likely to 
indicate that a well-calibrated speaker had “the best way of thinking”, rather than a 
speaker whose predictions were always “very sure”, even in the face of ambiguous 
evidence. 
Together, these findings indicate that a naive folk epistemology emerges very 
early in life. The dawn of epistemological understanding lies in infancy, where children 
develop an awareness of others’ mental states and how they are situated within the world. 
By preschool, a rudimentary ability to reason about specific features of beliefs (including 
their truth value, objectivity or subjectivity, and sources) is evident. Furthermore, by the 
early elementary years children have acquired a constructivist epistemological 
understanding whereby knowledge is recognized as a product of interpretive cognitive 
processes, and “good” justifications of beliefs are regarded as those that ought to cause 
belief, including reasons supported by evidence, logic or argument. 
Early epistemological development in social and cultural contexts. Just as the 
foundations of normative epistemological understanding emerge early in life and mature 
with age, so do individual differences in these beliefs. Developmental findings—
including those stemming from sociocultural, naturalized epistemology, testimonial 
learning, and educational traditions— identify family, social, and cultural contexts as 
important contributors to individual variations in epistemological understanding.  
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Family conversation and activity are known to be essential contexts for early 
cognitive and social development (Ash, 2003; Callanan & Valle, 2008; Ochs, Taylor, 
Rudolph, & Smith, 1992). Unsurprisingly, they also provide a context within which 
epistemological development occurs. For example, children’s exposure to language 
influences their theory of mind development: de Rosnay, Pons, Harris and Morrell (2004) 
examined the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental-state 
language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to 
make belief-based emotion attributions. They found that children who were more 
linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms 
were more likely to understand false belief, indicating that reaching a major milestone in 
epistemological understanding is supported by parent conversational and linguistic 
contributions. 
When Crowley, Callanan, Jipson, Galco, Topping & Shrager (2001) observed how 
parents and children co-construct knowledge and theories in museum settings, they found 
that when children engaged an exhibit with parents, their exploration of evidence was 
observed to be longer, broader, and more focused on relevant comparisons than children 
who engaged in the exhibit without their parents. Parents talked to children about how to 
select and encode appropriate evidence and how to make direct comparisons between the 
most informative kinds of evidence. Some parents also assumed the role of explainer by 
casting children's experience in causal terms, connecting their experience to prior 
knowledge, or introducing relevant abstract principles. Thus, in scaffolding children’s 
ability to collect evidence, interpret it, and use it to construct theories about the causal 
world, parents also support children’s ability to make epistemological judgments about 
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the origins, justification, and organization of knowledge. 
In a review of cross-cultural research on children’s social behavior, Mejía-Arauz 
and colleagues (2018) argue that shared thinking can be conceptualized either as 
negotiation, where individuals join their separate ideas, or collaboration, where people 
engage together as an ensemble. Middle-class European-Americans commonly have a 
negotiation-model of collective knowledge-construction, but a collaboration model that 
fits within a holistic worldview is more common in Indigenous-heritage communities of 
the Americas. Notably, these culturally-based epistemological ideas about negotiated or 
collaborative sense-making are reflected in children’s interactions with others during 
play, conversation, and other activities. 
In line with these ideas, Bang and Medin’s (2010a) take on an epistemological 
resources model represents both a developmental and sociocultural approach to 
understanding epistemological development. In their study of culturally specific 
“relational epistemologies”, they have found that regardless of whether they live in rural 
or urban environments, European-American and Native American (specifically 
Menominee) children organize their knowledge about the natural world in different ways. 
For example, Menominee children are more likely to justify their knowledge of the 
natural world in terms of dynamic systems, and use relational epistemologies to draw 
conclusions about natural phenomena and their own role in nature. Related 
developmental work using an inductive inference task provides further evidence that 
Menominee children are epistemologically precocious with respect to engaging in 
ecological reasoning (Ross, Medin, Coley, & Atran, 2003). Furthermore, much like their 
parents, older Menominee children are known to use conversational practices to promote 
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discussions about “native ways of knowing” with younger children (Bang, Medin, & 
Atran, 2007). 
They attribute these differences in viewpoints to the culturally variable 
epistemological practices experienced throughout development in family contexts. For 
example, they report that indigenous families—including those who live in urban 
environments—draw more attention to natural phenomena, causal systems, and 
epistemological phenomena during walks in nature (A. Marin & Bang, 2015; A. M. 
Marin, 2013). Compared to European-American families, Menominee families are more 
likely to display distinct modes of what consideration, responsibility, and contributions to 
nature mean (e.g. thanking plants for soothing children’s scrapes). Furthermore, 
Menominee parents also more frequently ask questions to guide attention, promote 
observations and assess knowledge about the natural world, asking children to seek 
evidence to support conclusions (e.g. asking children looking at evidence of erosion why 
they have concluded that a river used to flow there; asking children to make predictions 
about species interactions given the shared resources they compete for). Unsurprisingly, 
Native American children are more likely to view humans as animals (Waxman, 
Herrmann, Woodring, & Medin, 2014), learn of humans as part of, rather than separate 
from nature (Dehghani et al., 2013; Medin & Bang, 2014a), and hold a dynamic systems 
perspective of the biological world (Medin & Bang, 2014b; Unsworth, 2012). 
Bang and colleagues are not alone in studying cultural and parental practices as 
they relate to children’s epistemological development. Further research on family 
epistemological practices comes from Luce, Callanan, and Smilovic (2013). In their 
study, parents read a science-themed book with their 4- to 8-year-old children. Guided by 
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Kuhn, et al.’s (2000) framework of epistemological stances, they coded parents’ 
expressions of epistemology-related information (e.g., using evidence to reason about an 
opinion, appealing to statements of fact that do not need evidence, or pointing out that 
knowing for sure may not be possible) while discussing four science-related topics. They 
also coded children’s comments about evidence for two different science-related topics. 
Luce and colleagues found that variations in parents' tendency to express evaluativist 
epistemology (e.g. emphasize testable evidence as a way to address scientific questions) 
was correlated with the children's own focus on evidence in discussions about scientific 
topics. Interestingly, they also found variation in parents’ expressions of epistemological 
information by children’s age and gender for particular topics. They conclude that to the 
extent that children experience different conversational environments, they may seek 
different types of answers to questions, become familiar with different ways of thinking 
about “knowing,” and develop different strategies for being selective about learning from 
the testimony of others. 
Examining the conversational dynamics that may be at play in children’s 
developing understanding of probable and impossible events, Nolan-Reyes, Callanan and 
Haigh (2016) found that parents’ speculation about potential mechanisms for improbable 
events predicted young children’s possibility judgments for similar events, and accounted 
for more variance in children’s judgments than age did. Furthermore, parents’ skepticism 
regarding mechanisms for impossible events was negatively correlated with children’s 
judgments about the possibility of improbable events. Additionally, children’s overall 
causal justifications for their judgments were correlated with parents’ talk about 
speculative mechanisms. Results underline the importance of conversation with parents 
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for young children’s developing understanding of how claims about the improbable and 
impossible could be evaluated and justified or rejected. 
Work on children’s treatment of messages regarding improbable and impossible 
events also suggests that children’s religious backgrounds may influence their 
epistemological understanding. Harris, Pasquini, Duke, Asscher, and Pons (2006) found 
that children's ontological claims about real, invisible, supernatural, or scientific entities 
extend beyond their first-hand encounters with instances of a given category. Children 
readily endorse the existence of entities that they cannot see for themselves such as 
germs, oxygen and God (but not fictional entities such as mermaids, ghosts or flying 
pigs). As Harris and Koenig (2006) point out, children's understanding of God's special 
powers, the biological life cycle, or the afterlife shows that their acceptance of others' 
testimony extends beyond the empirical domain.  
Along these lines, Corriveau, Chen, and Harris (2015) asked 5- and 6-year-old 
children to make judgments about the reality status of protagonists in realistic, religious, 
and fantastical stories. Children from secular backgrounds were more likely than those 
from religious backgrounds to deny that the protagonist in religious stories was a real 
person. This supports the possibility that children’s skepticism towards improbable and 
impossible scenarios is in part tied to their minimal exposure to speakers who discuss and 
endorse miraculous possibilities. Further supporting this is evidence that Iranian children, 
who are regularly exposed to religious narratives in daily life, were prone to think of both 
realistic and fantastical figures in stories as real (Davoodi, Corriveau, & Harris, 2016). 
Thus, children justify or reject beliefs about improbable scenarios on the basis of the 
religious epistemological values endorsed in their lives. 
32 
In the domain of testimonial learning, Suárez and Koenig (in press) found that 
parents’ tendency to make evaluativist epistemological judgments (Kuhn et al., 2000) 
predicted their children’s relative reluctance to attribute knowledge to, or endorse the 
conclusions made by, a speaker who made unsound inferences or guesses. Along these 
lines, Suárez and Koenig (in prep) also found that parents’ evaluativist epistemological 
understanding was just as good of a predictor of children’s appreciation for a well-
calibrated speaker as their children’s age. That is, children whose parents display a 
relatively sophisticated epistemological orientation are more likely to make social 
learning decisions informed by their own understanding of the nature and justification of 
knowledge.  
It should also be noted that not only are individual’s epistemological beliefs 
related to learning outcomes—so are their parents’. As reviewed previously, Suárez and 
Koenig (in press; in prep) found that children whose parents made evaluativist judgments 
were more likely to do so themselves. That is, regardless of age, preschool and young 
school-aged children are more likely to attribute knowledge to, endorse the conclusions 
of, and make positive judgments about speakers who reason appropriately about 
evidence, and use it to calibrate the certainty of their predictions. Similarly, children’s 
talk about evidence during conversations about scientific controversies is reflective of 
parents’ conversational expressions of epistemological perspectives. This suggests, but 
does not conclusively demonstrate, that parents’ style of conversation may cultivate 
epistemological beliefs in their children that mirror their own, which in turn impacts 
children’s learning outcomes. Future research should clarify whether this is the case, as it 
has important implications not only for the experiences that support children’s ability to 
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optimize their own learning. 
Despite the limited experimental research examining the role of social, contextual, 
and cultural influences on the development of epistemological beliefs, correlational and 
observational findings strongly point to culturally-specific family conversation and 
practices as a likely source of individual differences. 
The Emergence of Mature Epistemological Beliefs. As Chandler, Hallett, & 
Sokol (2002) note, it seems counterintuitive that in so many studies examining the 
developmental progressions of epistemological beliefs, dualism (i.e. objectivism or 
absolutism) is the initial phase identified regardless of the age range being studied. Why 
do the stages in the pre-college population look so similar to those identified in late 
adolescence and adulthood? Furthermore, why is there so much individual variation in 
epistemological beliefs even among college students and older adults? Some of the 
possibilities listed by researchers include: early onset, late onset, recursion, suppression 
(Chandler et al., 2002), and domain dependence (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). 
In other words, developmental models and research are challenged by evidence 
that “just about every conceivable sort of epistemic development has been shown to 
characterize persons of just about every conceivable age” (Chandler, Hallett, & Sokol, 
2002, p. 161). This lack of coherence in developmental evidence and its interpretations 
have led Chandler and colleagues to argue that epistemological development is recursive: 
people pass through epistemic levels repeatedly within and across domains of epistemic 
cognition. It is not clear what evidence, beyond the evident lack of coherence among 
research findings, is being used to inform this hypothesis. 
Critiquing this view, Elby, Macrander and Hammer (2016) argued that the 
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recursion proposal is similar to the inelegant proposal of planetary “epicycles” as an 
effort to rescue Ptolemaic theories of celestial motion. Their epistemic resources model 
provides a comparatively parsimonious account of epistemological development, arguing 
that development is nothing more or less than the contextually-situated construction and 
coordination of resources which are employed when their use is productive. In this view, 
researchers’ varied attempts to define, measure, and interpret evidence of epistemological 
understanding suffers from a lack of coherence across methodologies, contexts in which 
development is studied, and domains of information participants reason about. 
Indeed, as Greene et al. (2016) point out in their review of frameworks in 
epistemic cognition, researchers have yet to appropriately and systematically document 
how context and domain influence participant responses. As a result, apparent 
developmental trends may or may not be an artifact of researchers’ own assumptions and 
methodologies. They also point out that notions of epistemic development from Perry 
(1970) and beyond have been rooted in a distinction that sees development as a slow, 
broad, maturational process. In reality, changes in epistemological views may be rapid 
and flexible adaptations to changing environmental influences. However, to this I would 
add that we ought to be wary of describing epistemological change as independent of 
maturation, because we cannot discount the possibility that context-dependent changes in 
epistemological viewpoints may be more or less successful depending on general patterns 
of development. 
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Chapter 3: Individual Differences in Adolescence and Adulthood 
In the wake of the publication of Schommer (1990), Kuhn and colleagues (2000), 
and others’ instruments measuring epistemological beliefs, there was an explosion of 
studies reporting correlates of specific epistemological beliefs in adolescents and adults. 
These findings hint at possible processes and influences that may contribute to individual 
differences in epistemological understanding, and also point to possible consequences of 
these variations. Together, this work suggests that differences in adolescents’ and adults’ 
epistemological understanding may be a result of, and uniquely contribute to, individual 
variations in cognitive, academic, social, and cultural factors. 
Culture, context and gender. In Chapter 2 I discussed how social and cultural 
contexts predict individual differences in epistemological development in childhood. 
Here in Chapter 3, I discuss individual differences in adolescents’ and adults’ 
epistemological understanding, as well as their predictive relation with various academic, 
social, developmental, and cognitive outcomes. 
Epistemological beliefs in adolescents and adults vary as a function of shared 
sociocultural values, such as collectivist vs individualistic values, gendered values, and 
values concerning power and conformity. For example, students from Korea— a country 
with relatively collectivist values— are more inclined to tie an inter-dependent self-
construal with learning outcomes than students from the more individualistic US (Youn, 
2000). Along these lines, college students in Oman were more likely than US students to 
accept scientific authorities as a basis of scientific truth, and also more likely to regard 
scientific knowledge as simple and certain; the latter was particularly true of Omani men 
as compared to Omani women (Karabenick & Moosa, 2005). Another study pointing to 
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systematic gender differences in epistemological beliefs reveals that female high school 
students reported having more constructivist beliefs about conceptual physics knowledge 
than male students, whereas male students tended to have more constructivist beliefs 
about procedural physics knowledge than female students (Muis & Gierus, 2014). 
Additionally, in a study exploring the way values about conformity and power, as well 
epistemological understanding, are related to gender orientation in German university 
students, Kessels (2013) found that the more male students valued power, the less they 
advocated evaluativist reasoning. Similarly, the more female students valued conformity 
and identified with feminine traits, the less they advocated for evaluativist reasoning.  
In a fascinating study on changing epistemologies under conditions of social 
change, Weinstock (2015) examined the epistemological understanding of three 
generations of Muslim Arab women from two communities in Israel: a small, 
homogenous village and a large, diverse city. Village adolescents were more subjectivist 
than their mothers and grandmothers, which was tied to their greater exposure to diverse 
people and ideas; however, there was not such a sharp generational divide in the urban 
sample, where the mothers and grandmothers were also exposed to such diversity. Thus, 
the changing social, economic, and political climate within which an individual is 
situated can have a marked impact on their epistemological beliefs, above and beyond 
effects of a shared ethnicity or heritage. 
In sum, there are a number of interesting ways in which individual differences in 
adolescent and adult epistemological beliefs interact with cultural and contextual factors 
such as ethnicity, generation, lifestyle (e.g. urban vs. rural), conformist and authoritarian 
values, and gender. However, it is unclear to what extent these are present in childhood, 
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or what developmental and causal mechanisms are involved in the enculturation of 
epistemological understanding. 
Epistemological reasoning in everyday life. Individual differences in 
epistemological understanding are also predictive of adolescents’ and adults’ learning and 
reasoning in everyday life. For example, individual differences in epistemological 
understanding have also been found to predict moral reasoning across a number of 
cultures, with relatively absolutist beliefs being associated with a tendency to treat moral 
beliefs as objective facts (Bendixen et al., 1998a). Indeed, epistemological understanding 
accounts for unique variance in moral reasoning above and beyond age, education, 
gender, and even syllogistic reasoning skills (Bendixen, Schraw, & Dunkle, 1998b).  
In the domain of identity development, relativistic epistemological thinking has 
been associated with a mature identity status in healthy adolescents. In contrast, there was 
no such correlation in a sample of adolescents who were hospitalized for unspecified 
psychiatric problems (M. Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990). Along these lines, Boyes and 
Chander (1992) found that adolescents’ epistemological understanding—specifically their 
tendency to acknowledge subjectivity and uncertainty—was predictive of the extent to 
which they had actively reflected upon, explored, and invested in their personal identity 
development. 
Variations in epistemological understanding have also been found to predict the 
competence with which individuals learn or reason in high-stakes professional contexts. 
For example, medical students with more advanced epistemological beliefs used more 
comprehensive, diverse and effective strategies during interviews and exams with 
patients (Oh, Chung, Han, Woo, & Kevin, 2016). Examining the relation between 
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epistemological beliefs and teaching behaviors. Roth and Weinstock (2013) reported that 
teachers who were rated by students as providing high levels of autonomy support—
operationalized by the authors as the extent to which they provided students with 
rationales for prosocial behavior, and the extent to which teachers took student 
perspectives— also scored as having more advanced personal epistemologies. 
Furthermore, individuals’ epistemological understanding is predictive of jurors’ ability to 
represent and argue about evidence, as well as the certainty of their verdict choices—
even after controlling for juror age, educational level, and gender (Weinstock, 2009; 
Weinstock & Cronin, 2003).  
Academic and Educational Outcomes. There is a particularly large amount of 
evidence describing how individual differences in students’ epistemological beliefs 
predict various academic outcomes in a wide range of disciplines. Among the first to 
report such findings were Schommer and colleagues (1992), who found that that a belief 
in knowledge as simple (rather than complex) was negatively correlated with 
mathematical comprehension and meta-comprehension. Furthermore, they found that the 
more students believed in simple knowledge, the more overconfident they were in their 
own comprehension. Notably, results from path analysis showed that the predictive 
relation between simple knowledge and mathematical comprehension was mediated by 
an overall processing strategy. That is, the more students believed that knowledge is 
simple, the more they engaged in memorization strategies, and the less they were able to 
effectively summarize important concepts. 
Accordingly, Schommer and colleagues (1992) argued that epistemic beliefs 
affect achievement both directly and indirectly. Problematically, there was no attempt to 
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establish this causal relationship experimentally, leaving open the possibility that the 
reverse was true: that is, that students with more sophisticated learning strategies develop 
more sophisticated concepts about the nature of knowledge. Furthermore, there was no 
attempt to account for possible third variables that could partially or completely account 
for these findings, such as IQ, need for cognition, executive functioning, SES, and so on. 
Studies making causal claims about the effects of epistemological beliefs on 
learning based on correlational data are hardly unusual. Qian & Alvermann (1995) 
studied the epistemological beliefs of high schoolers and found that students' beliefs 
about the certainty and simplicity of knowledge, as well as the speed and ease of 
learning, were associated with greater resistance to conceptual change. The authors even 
used these findings to call for interventions on both students’ and teachers’ 
epistemological beliefs to improve their learning and teaching, respectively. Even though 
no causal relationships were established, findings were presented as such, and researchers 
did not consider that the reverse might be true; that is, students who had more success 
engaging in conceptual change may have grown to believe that knowledge is complex 
and uncertain, and learning is slow and effortful. 
Examining the relation between epistemological beliefs and reading 
comprehension, Kardash & Howell (2000) presented undergraduate students with texts 
containing information about the link between HIV and AIDS that were both consistent 
and inconsistent with their own understanding of this health issue. They found that 
epistemological beliefs about the speed of learning were related to the overall number of 
strategies students engaged in to make sense of the texts. Strategies for accepting or 
resolving apparent ambiguities in text were related positively to delayed recall, and 
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cognitive processes for developing awareness were related negatively to the number of 
distorted conceptions developed by students. Again, these correlational findings were 
presented using causal language despite the lack of experimental manipulations of 
epistemological beliefs, and author inattention to third variables (e.g. executive 
functioning). 
Strømsø, Bråten and Britt (2010) also report a link between epistemological 
beliefs and reading comprehension. Controlling for readers’ prior knowledge and the 
text’s comprehensibility, they found that readers who believe strongly in relying on 
personal interpretations rather than on authorities trusted text less, and used the 
document’s content or their own opinion as criteria for judging trustworthiness. They also 
found that readers who believed that knowledge claims should be critically evaluated 
rated the science text as more trustworthy. 
Findings of a link between personal epistemology and learning outcomes extend 
to virtual learning contexts. Strømsø and Bråten (2010) found that dimensions of 
Internet-specific epistemic beliefs explained unique variance in Internet-based search, 
help-seeking, and self-regulatory strategies. Here, self-regulatory skills were 
conceptualized as the operational aspect of metacognition, including the planning, 
monitoring, and evaluation going on during learning and problem-solving. The authors 
found that students who emphasized that course-related knowledge located on the 
Internet consisted of specific facts and details were less likely to report that Internet-
search results were a problematic source of information; they were also more likely to 
report help-seeking strategies rather than self-regulatory strategies during Internet-based 
learning. In contrast, students who indicated that Internet search results were a set of 
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claims that need to be checked against reason and prior knowledge were more likely to 
report employing self-regulatory strategies when using the Internet during coursework. 
Interestingly, this points strongly to the possible role of cognitive self-regulation 
strategies in epistemic cognition; however, it is not clear to what extent this conception of 
self-regulation maps on to what developmental psychologists refer to as executive 
functioning. 
Muis and Franco (2009) examined relations between epistemic beliefs, 
achievement goals, learning strategies, and achievement among undergraduates studying 
educational psychology. Testing the hypothesis that epistemic beliefs influence processes 
of self-regulated learning, they asked students to recollect what metacognitive learning 
strategies they had employed as they completed course tasks. Using structural equation 
modeling techniques, researchers found that the epistemological beliefs activated during 
learning predicted the types of achievement goals students adopted, which subsequently 
predicted the types of learning strategies they used in their education course, and their 
achievement therein. Moreover, achievement goals mediated relations between 
epistemological beliefs and learning strategies, and learning strategies mediated relations 
between achievement goals and achievement. These findings suggest that any effects that 
epistemological beliefs may have on learning are not straightforward, but rather interact 
with a number of other cognitive and social factors to promote learning. 
It should be noted that despite all of this work suggesting that more sophisticated 
epistemological beliefs are predictive of better learning outcomes in mathematics, 
physics, reading comprehension, and so on, there is also evidence that sophisticated 
epistemological beliefs may not be necessary for deeper processing and enhanced 
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learning. Franco, Muis, Kendeou, Renellucci, Sampasivam and Wang (2012) found that 
when individuals’ epistemological beliefs were consistent with the knowledge 
representations in their assigned texts, they performed better on various measures of 
learning (use of deeper processing strategies, text recall, and changes in misconceptions) 
than when their epistemological beliefs were inconsistent with the knowledge 
representations. In other words, findings suggest that an individual will focus more on 
aspects of the content that are consonant with his or her epistemological beliefs such that, 
depending on how content-to-be-learned is presented, more mature epistemological 
understanding may not always result in enhanced learning. 
Results from a meta-analytic review conducted by Greene, Cartiff and Duke 
(2018) indicate that the correlation between epistemological understanding, as measured 
predominantly in terms of beliefs, and academic achievement is small, but meaningful. 
Additionally, they found that epistemological understanding predicted academic 
achievement as early as elementary school, and this continued throughout graduate 
school. Thus, epistemological understanding seems to be an important and consistent 
predictor of academic success throughout development. 
In sum, it appears that throughout development, individual differences in ones 
beliefs and reasoning about the nature and justification of knowledge are associated with 
a wide range of cultural and contextual factors such as generation, religious background, 
or gender. Furthermore, epistemological understanding has been consistently found to 
predict a wide range of developmental, academic and social outcomes. Interestingly, a 
number of studies indicate that this predictive relation holds even after accounting for 
variability in age, gender, education, and even certain cognitive skills. 
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Chapter 4: Mechanisms and Effects of Epistemological Development 
 To what extent do sophisticated personal epistemologies enhance critical thinking 
and learning (and vice versa)? In this chapter, I address important theoretical and 
methodological questions concerning the mechanisms of epistemological development 
and the widespread (mis)use of correlational evidence. In a review of the role of self-
regulation of academic learning and performance, Zimmerman (2008) characterized the 
question driving this body of research as a quest for understanding “how students become 
masters of their own learning processes” (p. 167). As Maggioni and Parkinson (2008) 
argue, a key aspect of this progress is the development of critical abilities that help 
learners to search for meaning, allowing them to be responsible actors in the learning 
process. It is difficult to imagine that epistemological evaluations— such as considering 
the quality of available information, reflecting on whether knowledge can be obtainable 
in a certain situation, and choosing how to assess reality— could have no influence on 
learning. Similarly, it makes intuitive sense that the practice of knowledge-acquisition 
would itself require students to develop their critical thinking and epistemological 
reasoning skills. However, as I review here, the causal evidence available is limited, often 
ambiguous, and does not speak to developmental processes as they occur in everyday 
informal learning contexts. 
What do we know about the causal influences on the development of 
epistemological beliefs? As reviewed in earlier chapters, existing models of personal 
epistemology are inconsistent in the extent to which they address mechanisms of change 
and development. However, we do know that there are a number of individual and 
contextual differences in epistemological understanding— varying by generation, urban 
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vs. rural lifestyles, ethnicity, religion, gender, and more— which strongly point to 
culturally- and contextually-dependent mechanisms of change. However the individual 
differences literature does not offer a particularly specific or mechanistic account of 
epistemological development. In this chapter, I review work from the developmental and 
educational psychology literatures that speaks more directly to mechanisms of 
epistemological development. Furthermore, I identify a major gap in these literatures, 
which I aim to address with the current study. 
How Epistemological Beliefs Change. Work on the developmental changes (e.g. 
Kuhn et al., 2000) in epistemological beliefs does indicate that a combination of 
cognitive maturation and acquisition of expertise contribute to the increasing 
sophistication of these perspectives throughout life. For example, Kuhn’s findings on 
experts suggest that acquiring a richer base of content knowledge in various domains 
supports more sophisticated and stable epistemological views within domains of 
expertise— for example, rabbis, philosophers and mathematicians hold evaluativist 
personal epistemologies in the domains of theology, philosophy and mathematics, 
respectively. 
Researchers motivated by the idea that promoting epistemological development 
will improve academic outcomes and science learning, over the last decades, have been 
working productively to understand how more adaptive epistemic cognition can be 
promoted (Greene et al., 2016a). From the educational psychology literature comes clear 
evidence that engaging in critical thinking and other academic interventions improve 
epistemological sophistication. For example, in elementary classrooms, domain-specific 
interventions in science (e.g., Metz, 2011; Ryu & Sandoval, 2012), mathematics (e.g., 
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Mason & Scrivani, 2004; Verschaffel et al., 1999), history (Nokes, 2014; VanSledright, 
2002), and language arts (Reznitskaya et al., 2012) suggest how engagement in 
scaffolded disciplinary practices can change students’ beliefs and thinking about 
knowledge and knowing within these disciplines. Such practices include the 
appropriation of norms surrounding the use of evidence and causal claims within a 
discipline (e.g. how to evaluate historical claims like a historian; how to teach biology 
like a biologist), encouragement from teachers to engage in evidence-based 
argumentation and inquiry dialogue, and supporting children’s abilities to design 
experiments and interventions. It is not currently known if changes brought about by such 
interventions affect individuals’ beliefs and thinking about knowledge and knowing 
outside formal educational contexts or across different academic domains; furthermore, it 
is not clear to what extent these interventions support epistemological development 
independent of the effects of knowledge-acquisition. That is, does “learning to learn” like 
a historian support epistemological development to a greater extent than simply learning 
historical content? 
Attempting to achieve a domain-general change in epistemic understanding, Muis 
and Duffy (2013) developed an instruction intervention to change the epistemic climate at 
the classroom level. Based on constructivist teaching practices, the intervention involved 
teacher modeling of critical thinking about content (for all domains), evaluation of 
multiple approaches to solving problems, and habitually making connections to prior 
knowledge. Students’ epistemological beliefs shifted midway through the semester; in 
contrast, students in a control classroom who did not receive this intervention maintained 
a consistent level of epistemological beliefs throughout the semester. Beyond a change in 
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epistemological beliefs, intervention students’ use of critical thinking, elaboration 
strategies, and epistemological reasoning also significantly increased, as did their levels 
of self-efficacy for learning statistics and their overall grades. There were no such 
changes for control group. 
More experimental work has brought to the forefront the potential role of critical 
thinking about conflict in the development of epistemological beliefs. Indeed, inducing 
cognitive conflict, either via direct instruction or refutation texts, appears to promote the 
development of sophisticated epistemological beliefs (e.g. Ferguson, L. E., Bråten, I., & 
Strømsø, H. I., 2012). For example, Kienhues, et al. (2008) used an experimental design 
featuring random assignment, making it possible to make clear inferences about the role 
of direct instruction as a cause of conceptual change. However, questions were rightly 
raised by study authors about the stability and sophistication of domain-specific 
epistemological beliefs, particularly when the learner’s domain knowledge is shallow. 
Gill, Ashton, and Algina (2004) took a slightly different approach to experimentally 
inducing conceptual change, termed “augmented activation”, which involved giving a 
treatment group an instructional intervention promoting cognitive conflict and critical 
thinking. They demonstrated greater overall change in implicit epistemological beliefs 
than a control group, and found partial support for the role of systematic processing (e.g. 
engaging in “deep” rather than “surface” thinking) as a mediator of the relation between 
general epistemological beliefs and change in specific epistemological beliefs. 
It should be noted that this work provides us a limited understanding of the 
duration, scope, and generalizability of changes in epistemic beliefs as a result of such 
interventions. Whether these changes represent short-term or domain-specific ways of 
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thinking about the nature of knowledge and knowing remains to be seen, and we would 
be remiss to promote the funding and implementation of any student, teacher or family-
level interventions without first considering these possible limitations. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no published causal evidence 
specifically concerned with how epistemological beliefs change in everyday 
developmental contexts outside of the classroom (although there is work framed in terms 
of theory of mind development (for a review see Ronfard et al., 2017)). Observational 
work on parents’ epistemological practices, particularly within the context of 
conversation about the natural world (e.g. Bang & Medin, 2010; Luce, Callanan & 
Smilovic, 2013), point to possible mechanisms by which children’s epistemological 
development is constructed by social processes. But experimental work is needed to 
better understand whether conversational expressions of epistemological perspectives 
influence children’s epistemological beliefs, or if relations between parents’ and 
children’s epistemological understanding could be partially or entirely explained by other 
factors (e.g. SES, intelligence, executive functioning). Despite the evidence that 
epistemological development that begins before the school years, as well as reported 
links between parents’ and children’s epistemological beliefs, important questions about 
mechanisms of epistemological development in everyday contexts remain unanswered. 
Along these lines, the field would also benefit greatly from thorough investigations of the 
roles of ethnicity, language, socioeconomic status, and individual differences in cognitive 
skills in children’s everyday epistemological thinking and development. 
Questioning Assumptions about Effects of Epistemological Beliefs on Learning. 
As I have reviewed, there is a large and ever-growing body of literature dedicated to 
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documenting the predictive relation between epistemological beliefs and individuals’ 
learning outcomes, including but not limited to mathematical, scientific learning, 
conceptual, and testimonial learning. Although it intuitively makes sense that one’s 
beliefs about the nature and justification of knowledge would have consequences for the 
way knowledge is constructed and evaluated in everyday life, there has been a surprising 
dearth of experimental evidence from outside academic contexts supporting this notion. 
Also troubling is the lack of research on other factors that may partially or completely 
account for reported relations between epistemological beliefs and certain outcomes (e.g. 
general intelligence, socioeconomic factors, executive functioning). 
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Part II: Methods 
Thus far, I have overviewed the predominant theoretical frameworks on personal 
epistemological understanding, described empirical findings on its development and 
individual differences, and assessed research on associated learning outcomes. In Part II 
of this manuscript I detail the research questions, aims, hypotheses, predictions and 
methodology. Specifically, in Chapter 5, synthesize the reviewed literatures to justify the 
research questions for the present study, and outline specific aims. In Chapter 6 I describe 
research design and methods, and in Chapter 7 I discuss specific hypotheses and 
predictions in terms of my study design. 
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Chapter 5: Research Aims 
Here I synthesize the reviewed literatures that motivate the research questions for 
the present study, and outline specific hypotheses and predictions. I begin by outlining 
three major gaps in the literature on the development of epistemological beliefs, focusing 
on three central topics: 1) mechanisms of epistemological development in everyday 
contexts; 2) assessing epistemological understanding explicitly versus indirectly as done 
with social learning tasks; and 3) cognitive and contextual sources of individual 
differences in epistemological understanding. 
  
I will be using Kuhn’s (2000) framework on epistemological beliefs to guide this 
work, as did Luce, et al. (2013) in their observational study of parent-child dyads’ 
discussions about science. According to this framework, epistemological beliefs can be 
characterized as absolutist, multiplist, or evaluativist, which refer to the extent to which 
an individual acknowledges the subjective and/or objective dimensions of knowledge. 
Absolutist beliefs hold that there is an objective standard of truth, and claims are either 
right or wrong. Multiplist beliefs hold that claims are subjective opinions which can be 
neither absolutely, nor relatively, right or wrong. Finally, evaluativist beliefs, which are 
more sophisticated due to their integration of the subjective and objective dimensions of 
knowledge, hold that claims can be relatively right or wrong, and weighed against 
Table 5.1. Epistemological beliefs as proposed by Kuhn, Cheney and Weinstock 
Stance Assertions Critical thinking 
Absolutist Assertions are facts that are correct or incorrect in 
their representation of reality. 
Comparing assertions to reality to 
determine truth value. 
Multiplist Assertions are opinions freely chosen by and 
accountable only to their owners. 
Irrelevant. 
Evaluativist Assertions are judgments that can be evaluated 
using to criteria of argument and evidence. 
Valuable way to promote sound 
assertions. 
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evidence. For this reason, evaluativist beliefs are typically thought to be most like 
scientific thinking. 
Research Aims. Efforts to clarify the nature and development of epistemological 
understanding would be extremely informative about basic socio-cognitive and 
developmental processes, and help to mend fractures between different research 
traditions. Equally important are the implications of such research for educational and 
parenting practices meant to support children’s learning and critical thinking.  
Aim 1: To Study Mechanisms of Change and Development in Epistemological 
Beliefs. Existing models of personal epistemology are inconsistent in the extent to which 
they address mechanisms of change and development. The educational psychology 
literature provides evidence that engaging in critical thinking and other academic 
interventions promotes epistemological sophistication (e.g. Kienhues et al., 2008). 
However, these studies do not address how epistemological development occurs in young 
children or in informal learning contexts. Observational work from developmental 
psychologists on parents’ epistemological practices, particularly within the context of 
conversation about science and the natural world (e.g. Bang & Medin, 2010b; Luce et al., 
2013), point to possible mechanisms by which children’s epistemological beliefs are co-
constructed. However, there is no experimental work testing whether such interactions 
have effects on children’s epistemological beliefs, or if parent-child similarities in 
epistemological beliefs can instead be explained by other factors (correlation vs. 
causation problem). Thus, the central aim of this dissertation is to test for effects of 
conversational expressions of epistemological perspectives on young children’s 
epistemological beliefs. 
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Aim 2: To Question Assumptions about Effects of Epistemological Beliefs. 
There is a burgeoning body of literature dedicated to documenting the predictive relation 
between epistemological beliefs and individuals’ learning outcomes, including, but not 
limited to, mathematical, scientific, conceptual, and testimonial learning (Sandoval, 
Greene & Braten, 2016). Furthermore, parents’ epistemological beliefs, as measured in a 
questionnaire (Kuhn, et al., 2000; Barzilai & Weinstock, 2015), predict children’s critical 
social learning from speakers who vary in their reasoning about evidence (Suárez & 
Koenig, in press; in prep). Although it intuitively makes sense that individuals’ (or 
parents’) beliefs about the nature and justification of knowledge would have 
consequences for the way children’s knowledge is constructed (or co-constructed) and 
evaluated, there has been a surprising dearth of experimental evidence supporting this 
notion. Most alarmingly, correlational evidence is widely used in the literature to support 
the conclusion that epistemological development will cause improved educational and 
developmental outcomes (e.g. Qian & Alvermann, 1995). This has led to a wave of 
teacher and student interventions meant to change epistemological practices within a 
specific academic discipline (e.g., Metz, 2011; Ryu & Sandoval, 2012), which are only 
occasionally based on experimental evidence. Even rarer is work examining the scope 
and duration of such interventions. Thus, here I test for effects of epistemological beliefs 
on young children’s evaluations of, and learning from, informants who vary in reasoning 
competence; as well as their epistemological beliefs in situations that vary in the 
perceived objectivity or subjectivity of the question at hand. 
Aim 3: To Examine Possible Effects of Individuals’ Cognitive Skills. A number 
of studies suggest that individuals’ self-regulation strategies—conceptualized in the 
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learning sciences literature as the planning, monitoring, and evaluation that occurs during 
learning and problem-solving (Brown 1987; Bråten, 1991)—may moderate the effects of 
epistemological beliefs on critical thinking and learning (e.g. Strømsø and Bråten, 2010.) 
However, the role of executive functioning (EF) in these processes has yet to be 
examined. EF is a set of cognitive self-regulatory processes including working memory, 
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility (Zelazo, et al., 2003). Like epistemological beliefs, 
EF has been implicated in a wide range of developmental and academic outcomes 
including social cognition (Carlson, et.al, 2004), mathematics achievement (Bull, et al., 
2008), and selective testimonial learning (Doebel, et al, 2016). Similarly, children’s 
verbal intelligence (verbal IQ) has been implicated in a wide range of developmental and 
academic outcomes (Sternberg, Grigorenko & Bundy, 2001; Deary, Strand, Smith & 
Fernandes, 2007; Deary, Weiss & Batty, 2011; Batty, Wennerstad, Smith, Gunnell, Deary, 
Tynelius, Rasmussen, 2009). Thus, here I examine if individual differences in children’s 
EF and IQ moderate or mediate the effects of epistemological framing on children’s 
epistemological beliefs, calibration, and evaluations of others’ calibration. 
Aim 4: To Identify Links Between Individual Differences in Children’s 
Epistemological Understanding and Parent Characteristics. As reviewed earlier, parent 
characteristics predict individual differences in children’s social learning. Specifically, 
parents’ epistemological beliefs predict 4- to 6-year-olds’ decisions about whether to trust 
informants who make unsound inferences or guesses (Suárez & Koenig, in press), and 
parent epistemological beliefs, authoritarianism (or the tendency to value deference to 
authority), and need for cognition (or the inclination towards engaging in effortful 
cognitive activity) predict children’s evaluations of speakers who succeed or fail to use 
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evidence to calibrate the certainty of their predictions (Suárez & Koenig, in prep). 
Although links between parents’ conversational expressions of epistemological stances 
do predict individual differences in children’s evidence talk (Luce, et al., 2013), there is 
no published work examining how parents’ epistemological responses on questionnaires 
correspond to children’s conversational epistemological expressions. Similarly, there has 
been no examination of children’s conversational expressions as they relate to parent 
authoritarianism, social conformity and need for cognition.  Thus, here I examine if 
individual differences in parents’ EU, authoritarianism, and need for cognition are 
related to their children’s own EU, use of statistical evidence in learning, and/or learning 
from agents who vary in their own learning from statistical evidence. 
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Chapter 6: Participants, Design and Procedure 
Participants. Participants were 54 6- and 7-year-old children and their parents.  
This age group was selected because it appears to be the age at which various forms 
epistemological understanding are emerging, such as the recognition of the value of 
reasoning and thinking as a way to construct knowledge and solve problems (Pillow, 
2012; Amsterlaw, 2006). Furthermore, this is the age at which there is suitable variability 
in children’s selective learning and epistemological judgments as found in Suárez and 
Koenig (2018). A sample size of at least 40 was chosen after an a priori power analysis 
with the program G* power (Erdfelder, et al., 1996) indicated this would provide 
sufficient statistical power to find within-subject intervention effects of at least moderate 
size.  Participants were recruited from the Institute Participant Pool (IPP), a database of 
families from the greater Twin Cities areas who have indicated interest in participating in 
research. Participants were screened to ensure that they spoke English fluently and had no 
visual, hearing or cognitive impairments that would interfere with their ability to 
participate in the study. 
Design. This study features a within-subjects experimental design, as well as a 
between-subjects correlational design to identify potential cognitive and parental factors 
predictive of individual differences in children’s epistemological understanding. 
Materials. Children’s executive functioning was assessed using the Minnesota 
Executive Functioning Scale (MEFS), an iPad-based, developmentally-appropriate and 
adaptive assessment. Their verbal knowledge (Verbal IQ) was assessed with the verbal 
component of the Kauffman Brief Intelligence Test II (KBIT 2). Children read a series of 
short vignettes displayed on a laptop with the experimenter in which characters disagreed 
56 
about an issue (see Appendix). Children were also presented with videos of speakers 
reasoning about causal properties of objects on a laptop. Parents were asked to complete 
five paper questionnaires: a basic demographic questionnaire, a questionnaire on 
epistemological perspectives (Barzilai & Weinstock, 2015), a questionnaire assessing 
authoritarian values (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), a questionnaire assessing social 
conformity (Feldman, 2003), and a questionnaire assessing Need for Cognition 
(Caccioppo & Petty, 2001). 
Procedure. The approximately 1-hour-long study occurred in 4 phases: (1) 
Cognitive assessments, (2) Baseline Assessments (Pretest), (3) Epistemological Framing 
(Intervention), and (4) Posttest Assessments. Within the Pretest and Posttest phases, there 
were two sub-phases, Calibration and Vignettes, the order of which was counterbalanced. 
Sessions were videotaped with parental consent and coded for reliability by two research 
assistants, one of whom was blind to phase. To assess how blind the coder truly was, they 
were asked to guess which phase they were coding if they had a hunch. Binomial 
analyses revealed that coders did not guess which phase they were coding at rates 
significantly different from chance, ps>0.05. Thus, coders were indeed blind to phase. 
Phase 1: Cognitive Assessment. Children’s executive functioning was assessed 
using the Minnesota Executive Functioning Scale (MEFS), a 5-minute long assessment 
administered via iPad that is developmentally appropriate for 6 and 7-year-olds (Carlson 
& Schaefer, 2012). Furthermore, their verbal knowledge was assessed with the Verbal 
Scale of the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test, 2nd edition (KBIT 2; Dumont & Willis, 
2008). This assessment involves individually administered verbal and nonverbal tasks 
that do not require reading or spelling, making it ideal for a quick assessment of young 
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children’s verbal skills. 
Phase 2: Baseline Assessments (Pretest). Epistemological Assessments. With an 
experimenter, children read 3 vignettes in which two characters disagreed about an issue 
with no clear answer or resolution. The issues represented one resolvable question of fact 
(“Objective”; e.g. whether it is raining outside), one issue of interpretation (“Mixed”; e.g. 
whether an exotic animal makes for a good pet), and one potentially unresolvable matter 
of taste (“Subjective”; e.g. whether a painting is pretty) as indicated by adult ratings. For 
each vignette, children were asked a series of questions concerning the cause of the 
disagreement, how it might be resolved, and whether there could be truth to both claims 
(see Appendix). Importantly, in this phase the experimenter responded positively to 
encourage further discussion, explanation and elaboration (e.g. “Ah, interesting”; 
“Thanks for sharing!”; “How come?”; “I see; could you tell me more?”), but did not 
make any statements indicating or promoting a specific epistemological stance. 
Children’s individual responses were collected, and their body of responses for each 
vignette— including their spontaneous remarks, explanations, elaborations, justifications, 
and interpretations— were coded as absolutist (A), evaluativist (E) or multiplist (M) 
based on whether they recognized that knowing involved objective fact, subjective 
interpretation, or both. To be clear, children’s stance was not decided based on whether 
they recognized the existence of objective facts and/or subjective opinions. Instead, these 
determinations were made based on whether or not children believed that objective facts 
and/or subjective opinions had any bearing on determining what is true, correct, or right. 
Calibration and Speaker Evaluations.  The procedure and measures for this phase 
have been taken from Suárez and Koenig, in prep; see Table X. Children watched a series 
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of 3 brief videos (order counterbalanced) in which a demonstrator placed a set of 4 
identical blocks (or toys) onto a toy box (or magnetic board) for two naïve speakers. Each 
trial featured a set with a unique appearance, and a unique proportion of causally 
effective blocks that appeared to make the box light up or to be magnetic: 50%, 75%, and 
100% causally effective items (order counterbalanced). On each trial, two speakers in the 
video were prompted by the demonstrator to predict whether an untested 5th block from 
the set would be effective. Children were asked to make their own predictions about the 
5th block and rate their certainty as “Very Sure”, “Kinda Sure”, or “Not So Sure” using a 
cartoon scale (Appendix). Then, they watched as one speaker (the Calibrator) made 
predictions in accordance with the evidence (e.g. after seeing 50% effective blocks, 
saying she was “not so sure” if the 5th item would work; after seeing 75% effective 
blocks, saying she was “kinda Sure”; after seeing 100% effective blocks, saying she was 
“very sure”; ). The second speaker (Overconfident) was always “very sure” the new 
block would work, even in the face of ambiguous evidence (e.g. blocks that were 50% or 
75% effective). Children’s evaluations of reasoners’ competence was assessed in each 
trial by asking “Who has the best way of thinking—Speaker A, Speaker B, or both?”. 
After the 3 trials, children were asked two additional questions to assess their epistemic 
attributions and personal preferences (“Who knows more: Speaker A or Speaker B?”, and 
“Who do you like more: Speaker A or Speaker B?”). 
Phase 3: Epistemological Framing (Intervention). As in the Vignette portion of 
the pretest, children and the experimenter read 3 vignettes together concerning one 
resolvable question of fact (“Objective”; e.g. when grandma married grandpa), one issue 
of interpretation (“Mixed”; e.g. whether coach is nice or mean), and one potentially 
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unresolvable matter of taste (“Subjective”; e.g. whether a board game is boring). 
However, in order to promote more sophisticated epistemological reasoning and beliefs, 
children were exposed to the experimenters’ epistemological framing, using questions 
and statements that reflected  an evaluativist epistemological perspective. To do this, 
there were two major differences between the pretest and intervention phases. First, the 
experimenter asked all children some additional questions meant to encourage deeper 
reasoning about the certainty, construction, justification, and interpretation involved in 
“knowing” (see Appendix). Second, the experimenter would respond to the child’s 
specific answers with feedback and additional questions meant to counter absolutist or 
multiplist ideas in favor of evaluativist perspectives. For example, if a child expressed the 
belief that a juju could either be a good or bad pet based on whether it is “wild”, the 
experimenter would counter this absolutist idea by asking the child to consider if what 
makes for a “good” pet depends not only on objective facts about jujus, but also on 
personal preference or interpretation. Similarly, if a child indicated that the beauty of a 
painting is entirely a matter of opinion, the experimenter would suggest that while 
“pretty” or “ugly” paintings are in the eye of the beholder, there are certain objective 
standards by which art is evaluated (e.g. art experts will describe famous painters in terms 
of their innovation, technique, or content). 
Throughout this conversation, children were also provided more support and 
suggestions when asked about ways in which the characters might try to “figure out” the 
matter at hand. Ideas that were in line with evaluativist beliefs and reasoning were 
particularly reinforced (e.g. “Great idea!”, “Wow, that’s a really clever way to think about 
it!”). In contrast, expressions of multiplist or absolutist epistemological beliefs were met 
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with enthusiastic interest (e.g. “Interesting, thanks for sharing!”, “Wow, you’re really 
making me think!”), immediately followed by an alternative perspective in line with 
evaluativist perspectives was also reiterated (e.g. “I have an idea! What if ….”). 
Phase 4: Posttest. In this phase, the effects of this “epistemological framing” on 
children’s everyday epistemological judgments and social learning were assessed. Just as 
in the pretest phase, children were presented with 3 vignettes in which two characters 
disagree, with no clear resolution, about issues ranging from immediately resolvable 
questions of fact (e.g. when pianos were invented), issues of interpretation (e.g. whether a 
basketball team is good), and potentially unresolvable matters of taste or value (e.g. 
whether a movie was good). After reading each vignette, children were asked the same 
set of questions as in the pretest, and the experimenter did not provide any kind of 
feedback. Furthermore, children watched another set of 3 videos in which 2 reasoners—a 
Calibrator and Overconfident speaker— observed probabilistic evidence and made 
predictions, just as they did in the pretest. 
Coding. Percent agreement between coders was at 97% overall, and 92% with 
regards to coding stance. Coder disagreements were resolved by reviewing to the videos 
together and jointly deciding how to code. Utterances that located the source of the 
disagreement exclusively in the world, made no allowance for legitimate diversity of 
opinion, and/or assumed that the world supplies the same answer to everyone were 
classified as absolutist. At the other extreme, responses that located the source of the 
disagreement exclusively within individuals, failed to recognize the need for evidence or 
evaluation of statements, and/or held that personal reaction is a legitimate basis for 
judgment which renders all opinions as equally valid, were classified as multiplist. 
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Responses were coded as evaluativist if they reflect coordinated objective and subjective 
considerations by requiring empirical or logical support for divergent positions, and/or 
envisioned agreed-upon criteria as alternatives to sheer multiplism. 
Coders also noted the child’s level of engagement during the intervention phase, 
meant to be an index of the effectiveness of the intervention on the individual. This three-
level measure of engagement represented whether children were resistant, receptive, or 
elaborative for each vignette. If children ignored and/or rejected the experimenter’s 
suggestions or evaluativist perspectives in a given vignette, they received a 0 out of 2 on 
the engagement scale (resistant). If children acknowledged and accepted—but did not 
elaborate upon—the experimenter’s comments and suggestions, they received a 1 of out 
2 (receptive). Finally, if children responded contingently to the experimenter with their 
own epistemological questions, ideas, and expressions of evaluativist perspectives, they 
received a 2 out of 2 on the engagement scale (elaborative).
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Chapter 7: Hypotheses and Predictions 
Hypothesis 1: Effects of Epistemological Framing. Adults’ epistemological 
framing in the context of conversation about disagreements or controversies influences, 
and is reflected in, children’s epistemological judgments and critical thinking in social 
learning. Consequently, I predict that there will be significant main effects of evaluativist 
epistemological framing on children’s epistemological expressions during conversations 
about everyday controversies. That is, in the posttest children will make more comments 
reflecting evaluativist epistemological values, and less multiplist or absolutist comments, 
than children in the pretest. I also predict that after the intervention children will be more 
likely to indicate that a speaker who calibrates their certainty with evidence has the “best 
way of thinking”, rather than a speaker who is always “very sure” no matter how 
ambiguous the evidence. Similarly, I predict that children will attribute more knowledge 
to the Calibrator in the posttest.  
Hypothesis 2: Effects of EF and IQ.  I hypothesize that executive functioning 
skills and verbal knowledge support the coordination of subjective and objective 
dimensions of knowing that characterizes evaluativist epistemological thinking, as well 
as on learning and critical thinking outcomes more generally. Thus, I predict that there 
will be main effects of EF and IQ, such that children with better EF and verbal IQ will be 
more likely to make evaluativist statements at baseline, and will show more critical 
evaluations and testimonial learning at baseline as well. Specifically, I predict that 
children with stronger EF skills will be more receptive to Evaluativist Framing. 
Hypothesis 3: Predictive Relations Between Parent and Child Measures. I 
hypothesize that individual differences in parent characteristics are related to those in 
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their children. Specifically, I predict that children whose parents are relatively high in 
evaluativist beliefs and need for cognition, and relatively low in authoritarianism and 
social conformity, will make more evaluativist statements in the baseline phase— even 
after controlling for EF and IQ. 
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Part III: Results 
In this section of the manuscript, I outline the major findings in the current study, 
which correspond to my central research aims.  I begin by overviewing observed 
developmental trends, testing for effects of the intervention, and understanding individual 
differences.  
It should be noted that the “best fitting” models described in the following 
chapters were selected using a forward stepwise regression technique on the basis of their 
adjusted R2 (Nagelkerke). This is a measure of the total variance explained by the model 
similar to the R2, and can be interpreted in the same way, but with the added benefit of 
being adjusted to correct for the number of predictors. 
It should also be noted that in data tables, M and SD are used to represent mean 
and standard deviation, respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% 
confidence interval for each correlation. The confidence interval is a plausible range of 
population correlations that could have caused the sample correlation.
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Chapter 9: Participants 
This sample of participants featured 54 6 and 7-year-olds (M=7.09 years, 
SD=0.55; 42.6% boys) from the Twin Cities and the surrounding areas, and their parents. 
Demographic data indicated that the racial/ethnic diversity of the sample was greater than 
that of the Twin Cities (see Table 9.1). However, it is important to note that reliable and 
recent demographic data on parents and children from the Twin Cities area was not 
found. Thus, comparisons made between the study sample and the general TC population 
should be taken as only rough indicators of how representative this study sample is. 
 Parents. Examining parent education and family income, the sample was highly 
educated and affluent relative to the general population.  
 Parent Educational Attainment. About 82% of children had at least one parent 
with a bachelors’ degree or higher, and about 14% had at least one parent with a 
doctorate (e.g. Doctorate, EdD) or professional degree (e.g. MD, JD). However, it should 
be noted that the available data on the general population was limited to adults over the 
age of 25, and we did not collect any data on parent age; thus, it is doubtful that samples 
are perfectly equivalent in terms of individuals’ age. Furthermore, data on the general TC 
population indicates that there is a significant and sizable gender gap for educational 
attainment, with women being up to 20% more likely to have an Associate’s, Bachelor’s, 
or Master’s degree (note: the TC rate of doctorate and professional degrees is below 4%; 
thus, although men are about 45% more likely to have these degrees than women, the 
gender disparities here are differences of about 0.4%). Although we did not collect data 
on parent gender, it was fairly evident to researchers that most of the parents who 
participated were women. Therefore, this may (at least partially) account for the large 
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disparity in educational attainment between the study sample and general population. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how our sample’s parents compare to the subset of the general 
TC population who have children. 
Table 9.1 
 
Participant family educational attainment compared with that of general TC population. 
 
 Twin Cities Participants 
Doctorate 3.9% 14.3% 
Master’s Degree 9.6% 32.7% 
Bachelor’s Degree 26.4% 34.7% 
Associate’s Degree 10.2% 14.3% 
Some College 20.9% 4.1% 
High School Diploma 22.1% 0% 
Before High School Diploma 6.7% 0% 
 
Table 9.2 
 
Participant family income compared with that of general TC population. 
 Twin Cities Participants 
95th percentile 232.9k 250k+ 
80th percentile 131.4k 140-179,999k 
60th percentile 86.8k 100-139,999k 
Median 70.9k 100-139,999k 
40th percentile 56.4k 80-99,999k 
20th percentile 30.8k 50-79,999k 
 
Family Income. A staggering 100% of participating families had an annual 
income of at least $50,000, with about half making at least $100,000 annually. Thus, 
despite efforts to recruit diverse participants, a comparison of family income percentiles 
clearly indicates that children in the study sample come from more affluent families that 
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the general TC population. Again, it is unclear how our sample’s parents compare to TC 
parents more generally. 
Parent characteristics. Parent surveys were used to ascertain individual variation 
in epistemological judgments, authoritarian values, and need for cognition (Table 9.3). 
On average, parents were low in authoritarianism (M= 0.24 out of 1, SD= 0.27) and 
social conformity (M=0.25 out of 1, SD= 0.19). In contrast, Need for Cognition Scores, 
which ranged from -36 to 36, were moderately high (M= 15.81, SD= 11.51). As expected 
authoritarianism was highly correlated with social conformity (r =0.69, p<0.01), and 
negatively correlated with need for cognition (r =-0.33, p<0.05). The correlation between 
social conformity and need for cognition was marginally significant and negative, r= -
0.26, p=0.06.  
Parents also made 11 epistemological judgments in each of the domains of history 
and biology, with the number of absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist responses added 
up into 3 separate scores for each domain. Parents’ absolutist scores in history (range: 0-
11; M=3.61, SD=2.58) and biology (range: 0-11; M= 6.26, SD= 3.20) were also used to 
calculate an Absolutist Total (range: 0 – 22; M= 9.87, SD=5.15). Similarly, multiplist 
scores in history (range: 0 – 11; M= 1.17, SD= 1.19) and Biology (range: 0-11; M= 0.26, 
SD= 0.68) were used to calculate a Multiplist Total (range: 0 – 22; M= 1.43, SD= 1.61); 
and evaluativist scores in history (range: 0 – 11; M= 5.96, SD=2.85 ) and biology (range: 
0 – 11; M= 4.48, SD= 3.24) were used to calculate an Evaluativist Total  (range: 0 – 22; 
M= 10.44, SD= 5.58). 
Parent authoritarianism and social conformity were not significantly or marginally 
correlated with any measure of parent epistemological beliefs. In contrast, parent need for 
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cognition was marginally and negatively correlated with Multiplist Totals (r= -0.27, 
p=0.07). However, this finding should be taken with caution given the relatively low rate 
of multiplist responses. 
There were no significant correlations between measures of socioeconomic status 
and authoritarianism, social conformity, or need for cognition. Furthermore, there was 
only one significant correlation between a measure of epistemological understanding and 
SES: parent educational attainment was positively correlated with the tendency to make 
evaluativist epistemological judgments, r= 0.286, p<0.05. 
Table 9.3 
 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals (Spearman) for 
parent characteristics 
  
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Authoritarianism 
(0 to 1) 
0.24 0.27           
 
2. Social 
Conformity  
(0 to 1) 
0.25 0.19 
.69** 
[.51, .81] 
        
 
3. Need for 
Cognition  
(-36 to 36) 
15.81 11.51 
-.33* 
[-.55, -.06] 
-.26 
[-.50, .02] 
      
 
4. Total Absolutist 
Judgments  
(0 to 22) 
9.87 5.15 
.05 
[-.22, .32] 
.16 
[-.12, .41] 
-.02 
[-.28, .25] 
    
 
5. Total Multiplist 
Judgments  
(0 to 22) 
1.43 1.61 
.04 
[-.24, .30] 
-.00 
[-.27, .27] 
-.25 
[-.48, .02] 
.05 
[-.22, .31] 
  
 
6. Total Evaluativist 
Judgments  
(0 to 22) 
10.44 5.58 
-.09 
[-.35, .18] 
-.19 
[-.44, .08] 
.11 
[-.16, .37] 
-.94** 
[-.96, -.89] 
-.33* 
[-.55, -.06] 
Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
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Children. Children were 6 or 7 years old (M=7.09 years, SD=0.55, N=54). 
Almost half of the children were in 1st grade (47.37%), with the remaining participants in 
2nd grade (31.6%) and kindergarten (21%). Over half of the participants were girls 
(~57.4%, N=31 girls). 
Race/Ethnicity. With regards race/ethnicity, it should first be noted that 
comparison data from the general TC population includes people of all ages; furthermore, 
it excludes mixed-race and Hispanic individuals from the White/ Caucausian, 
Black/African/African-American, and Asian/Asian-American categories (The 
Demographic Statistical Atlas of the United States, 2018). However, due to the large 
number of mixed-heritage participants in the current study sample (~30%), the 
demographic diversity of the sample is best understood when these categories are not 
treated as mutually exclusive (Table 9.4).  
For this sample, a vast majority of children reported being of European heritage 
(94.4%); however, only about 65% of children were of solely European heritage, which is 
below the general population. Put differently, almost all participants had at least one 
White parent or grandparent. Due in part to the high rate of mixed heritage backgrounds, 
the current sample features less children from ex Black/African-American backgrounds 
(~3.7%) than the general population (~ 7.8%); however, about 13% of children in our 
sample were of Black/ African-American heritage, which is far greater than the general 
population even if one were to assume that all mixed heritage individuals from the 
general population identified as Black/African American. A similar pattern emerges with 
other ethnic groups: no children were of solely Hispanic/Latino ethnicity; however, two 
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Hispanic/Latino children also belonged to one or more ethnic groups, as is common for 
Hispanic/Latino populations. The study sample also featured a number of participants of 
mixed Native American or Native Alaskan heritage (~4%), Asian heritage (~13%), and 
“Other” heritage (~4%; e.g. Persian, Arab, Pacific Islander). 
Table 9.4 
 
Children’s racial/ethnic background compared with that of general TC population. 
 
 Twin Cities 
(Mutually Exclusive) 
Participants  
(Mutually Exclusive) 
Participants (Non- 
Mutually 
Exclusive) 
White Non-Hispanic 77.1% 64.8% 94.4% 
Black Non-Hispanic 7.8% 3.7% 13% 
Asian Non-Hispanic 6.2% 1.9% 13% 
Hispanic 2.8% 0% 3.7% 
Native American/ 
Native Alaskan 
 
2.6% 0% 3.7% 
Native Hawaiian / 
Pacific Islander 
 
N/A N/A 1.9% 
Mixed Heritage 2.8% 29.6% N/A 
Other 0.7% 0% 3.7% 
Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Cognitive Measures. In keeping with findings suggesting the study sample is not 
representative in terms of parent educational attainment and family income, children’s 
executive function and verbal IQ scores were not representative of the national average 
for their age, with the mean MEFS score (M=110.13, SD= 8.67) being a standard 
deviation above the national average (M=100, SD= 10), and mean Verbal KBIT2 score 
(M= 120.02, SD = 16.61) being over two standard deviations above the national average 
(M=100, SD= 10). Unsurprisingly, age was correlated with grade (r= 0.88, p<0.001) and 
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verbal IQ (r= 0.29, p<0.05). Furthermore, executive functioning and verbal IQ were 
correlated, r= 0.38, p< 0.01 (Table 9.5).  
Table 9.5 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations between cognitive measures and age 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 
1. Age 
(continuous) 
7.09 0.55       
2. Grade 1.11 0.73 .87**     
      [.77, .93]     
3. Verbal IQ 120.02 16.61 .26 .24   
      [-.01, .50] [-.08, .52]   
4. Executive 
Functioning 
110.13 8.67 .15 .13 .39** 
      [-.13, .40] [-.20, .43] [.13, .60] 
Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Parent-Child Intercorrelations. Examining intercorrelations among parent and 
child characteristics revealed that children’s executive functioning was related to two 
parent characteristics. Parent need for cognition was marginally significantly correlated 
with children’s MEFS scores (r= 0.24, p=0.09). Furthermore, parent social conformity—
but not authoritarianism— was significantly negatively correlated with children’s MEFS 
scores (r = -0.28, p= 0.05). However, this was no longer the case after controlling for 
parent need for cognition (rp= -0.04, p= 0.77).  Children’s age, EF and IQ were not 
correlated with any other parent measures. 
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Table 9.6 
  
Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals 
  
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 
       
1. MEFS (EF) 110.13 8.67         
              
2. KBIT2 (IQ) 120.02 16.61 .39**       
      [.13, .60]       
              
3. Parent Need for 
Cognition 
15.81 11.51 .24 .16     
      [-.03, .48] [-.11, .42]     
              
4. Parent 
Authoritarianism 
0.24 0.27 -.22 -.22 -.33*   
      [-.47, .06] [-.47, .06] [-.55, -.06]   
              
5. Parent Social 
Conformity 
0.25 0.19 -.27 -.31* -.26 .69** 
      [-.51, .00] [-.54, -.04] [-.50, .02] [.51, .81] 
Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
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Chapter 10: Baseline Data 
Calibration Trials. Across the three Calibration Trials of the Pretest, children 
were asked to make a prediction based on observed data and rate their own certainty on a 
3-point-scale. Children indicated that they were “Very Sure” (M=1.1 out of 3, SD=0.82) 
about a third of the time, “Kinda Sure” (M= 1.40 out of 3, SD = 1.01) just under half of 
the time, and “Not So Sure” more rarely (M=0.60, SD=0.62). 
An ANOVA analysis indicated that certainty levels occurred at significantly 
different rates, F(2,53) = 55.41, p<0.001, µ= 0.53. Post-hoc analyses (Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons) revealed that children were “very sure” significantly 
less often than they were “kinda sure” (1.60 +/- 0.34) and “not so sure” (2.7 +/- 0.25).  
They were also “kinda sure” significantly more often than “not so sure” (1.10 +/- 0.14). 
A score was calculated to represent the extent to which children’s certainty was 
aligned with the strength of observed statistical evidence. Children were awarded a point 
if they were “very sure” in the 100% trial, “kinda sure” in the 75% trial, and “not so sure” 
in the 50% trio. Children were given partial credit in the form of half a point when they 
were “kinda sure” in the 100% trial, “not so sure” in the 75% trial, and “kinda sure” in 
the 50% trial. Points were totaled for each child’s Calibration Score, which could range 
from 0 to 3 (M=1.05, SD=0.76). 
Children were also asked to recall how many blocks were causally effective, as 
well as the certainty of speaker predictions. However, children made virtually no errors 
recalling block efficacy (M=0.001 errors out of 3, SD=0.09), and made very few errors 
regarding the Calibrator’s statements (M= 0.11 out of 3, SD= 0.31) and Overconfident 
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speaker’s statements (M= 0.04 out of 3, SD= 0.19).  
Table 10.1  
 
Correlations Among Children’s Explicit Judgments of Speakers  
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Children’s evaluations of speaker reasoning were also analyzed (Figure 10.1). 
After each trial participants were asked “Who has the best way of thinking?” (Figure 
10.1). Some children chose the Overconfident speaker (M=0.31 out of 3, SD=0.61), but 
many chose the Calibrator (M= 0.87 out of 3, SD= 0.9), or “both” (M= 1.07 out of 3, 
SD= 0.95). An ANOVA analysis revealed that children chose speakers at significantly 
different rates, F(2, 53) = 11.49, p<0.001, µ= 0.18.  
 
Figure 10.1. Children’s explicit judgments of speakers at baseline 
Post-hoc analyses (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons) revealed that 
children were significantly more likely to say the Calibrator had the “best way of 
thinking” compared to the Overconfident speaker (0.67 +/- 0.17), and significantly more 
likely to say both speakers had the “best way of thinking” compared to just the 
Overconfident speaker (0.76 +/- 0.15).  
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After the 3 trials, children were asked which of the two speakers they believed 
“knows more”, with about half choosing the Calibrator (M= 0.52 out of 1, SD=0.5), and 
most others choosing the Overconfident speaker (M= 0.39, SD=0.49).  An ANOVA 
analysis revealed that children’s attributions of knowledge for the Calibrator and 
Overconfident speaker were not significantly different, p= 0.97. 
Children were also asked which of the two speakers they liked more. The 
Calibrator was chosen most often (M= 0.44 out of 1, SD= 0.5), followed by the 
Overconfident speaker (M = 0.22, SD= 0.42). A substantial fraction of children refused to 
pick just one, and indicated they liked “both” (M= 0.17, SD = 0.42). An ANOVA 
analysis revealed that children provided these three categories of responses at 
significantly different rates, F(2, 53)= 4.27, p=0.02, µ=0.07. Specifically, post-hoc 
analyses (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons) revealed that children were 
significantly more likely to say they liked the Calibrator rather than say they liked both 
speakers equally (0.278 +/- 0.10). However, children did not like the Calibrator and 
Overconfident speaker at significantly different rates. Likely due to the low rate of 
memory errors, there was no significant relation between children’s memory of events 
and their explicit judgments about speakers, ps>0.05. 
 Intercorrelations. Children’s Calibration Scores (Table 10.2) were not correlated 
with age, EF or IQ; however, they were negatively correlated with their tendency to say 
they liked “both” speakers (r= -0.32, p<0.05), and that “both” speakers “know more” (r= 
-0.28, p<0.05). Thus, children who were poorly calibrated were less likely to discriminate 
between speakers on the basis of their perceived knowledge or likeability. 
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Table 10.2 
 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals for calibration 
scores 
Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
Children’s tendency to credit the “best way of thinking” to the Calibrator was 
correlated with a number of measures. As expected, it was strongly positively correlated 
with their crediting the Calibrator with “knowing more” (r= 0.61, p< 0.01); negatively 
correlated with saying the Overconfident speaker had “the best way of thinking” (r= -
0.40, p< 0.01) and knew more (r= -0.40, p< 0.01); and negatively correlated with saying 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
1. Age 7.09 0.55               
                    
2. Sex 0.42 0.50 -.02             
      [-.29, .25]             
                    
3. EF (MEFS) 
110.
13 
8.67 .15 -.34*           
      [-.13, .40] 
[-.56, -
.07] 
          
                    
4. IQ (KBIT 2) 
120.
02 
16.61 .26 -.11 .39**         
      [-.01, .50] [-.37, .17] [.13, .60]         
                    
5. Calibration 
Score 
1.67 0.62 -.03 .02 .15 -.08       
      [-.29, .24] [-.26, .29] [-.12, .41] [-.34, .20]       
                    
6. EJT 
Composite (C) 
0.65 0.48 .18 -.09 .13 -.22 .29*     
      [-.09, .43] [-.35, .19] [-.15, .39] [-.46, .06] [.03, .52]     
                    
7. EJT 
Composite (O) 
0.38 0.36 -.22 .17 -.11 -.04 .02 -.22   
      [-.47, .05] [-.11, .42] [-.37, .17] [-.31, .24] [-.25, .29] [-.46, .06]   
                    
8. EJT 
Composite (B) 
0.52 0.35 -.14 -.01 .16 .00 .06 -.02 .19 
      [-.40, .13] [-.28, .26] [-.12, .41] [-.27, .28] [-.21, .33] [-.29, .25] [-.08, .44] 
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both speakers had the “best way of thinking” (r= -0.31, p< 0.05). Along these lines, 
children’s tendency to say the Calibrator “knows more” was also positively correlated 
with liking her more (r= 0.34, p<0.05). Furthermore, children’s overall composite score 
for the calibrator was positively correlated with children’s own calibration scores, r= 
0.29, p<0.05. Thus, children who showed a preference for the Calibrator were more 
likely to be well-calibrated themselves. 
Interestingly, children’s executive functioning skills were negatively associated 
with their tendency to preferentially like the Overconfident speaker, r= -0.37, p<0.01. 
Furthermore, a few sex differences were noted: boys tended to have lower EF Scores than 
girls (r= -0.34, p< 0.05), and were more likely to indicate that Overconfident speaker has 
“best way of thinking” (r = 0.28, p< 0.05), and say that they liked her more (r = 0.28, p< 
0.05). However, boys’ preferences for the unjustifiably certain speaker disappeared after 
controlling for MEFS scores. Thus, while it may be that boys tend to prefer overconfident 
speakers more than girls, this is likely because these preferences are negatively associated 
with EF skills. 
These results are, for the most part, in line with the hypothesis that children’s 
ability to make critical evaluations of speakers on the basis of their calibration rests, in 
part, on cognitive control (e.g. working memory, task switching, inhibition). However, 
there was no significant relation between children’s overall preference for the 
Overconfident speaker (composite score) and their EF skills, r= -0.11, p>0.05.  
Interim Summary 
 A composite score was calculated to reflect the proportion of times (out of 5) that 
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children displayed a preference for the Calibrator, Overconfident speaker, or Both 
(Figure 10.2). An ANOVA analysis revealed a significant effect of speaker on children’s 
judgments, F(2, 51)= 4.99, p=0.01, partial eta2= 0.16. Post-hoc analyses (Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons) revealed that children chose the Calibrator 
significantly more often than the Overconfident speaker (+/-0.208, p<0.01), and 
marginally more often than “both” speakers, (+/-0.14, p=0.07). Thus, to summarize, 
children were not particularly impressed by the Overconfident speaker; however, a 
significant subset of children did not discriminate between the two, choosing “Both”. 
 
Figure 10.2. Children’s Explicit Judgments of Reasoners at Baseline (Composite Scores) 
 
Furthermore, results would suggest that EF may play a role in children’s preferences, as 
lower EF skills are associated with a personal, social preference for the Overconfident 
speaker (“Like”). However, these results are not fully in line with the hypothesis that 
executive functions (e.g. inhibition) are involved in speaker evaluations, as there was no 
direct link between EF and children’s epistemic evaluations (“best thinking”, “knows 
more”). However, the correlation between calibration scores and preference for the 
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Overconfident speaker does suggest that children’s own ability to adjust their beliefs in 
line with evidence is relevant to their judgments of others’ ability to do so. 
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Vignettes. Throughout the three vignettes, children correctly indicated that the characters 
disagreed rather than agreed about the topic (M= 2.83 out of 3, SD=0.42) at rates 
significantly greater than chance, p<0.05. Thus, as a group, children not only understood 
the meaning of the word “disagree”, but were able to successfully recognize a 
disagreement between two speakers. 
Making sense of disagreements. When asked if it made sense that there would be 
disagreement about the topic, on average children said “yes” most of the time (M=1.81 
out of 3 trials, SD=1.07), “no” about a third of the time (M=1.09 out of 3 trials, SD= 
1.09), and almost never said “maybe” (M= 0.02 out of 3 trials, SD=0.14). A paired t-test 
indicated that children were significantly more likely to indicate that it would “make 
sense” to disagree about the topic as opposed to “not make sense”, t(53)= 2.5, p=0.01, d= 
0.34. This suggests that children are aware of, and understand, diverging perspectives. 
Figuring it out. When asked if they believed the characters might need help to 
figure out the issue, about two-thirds of responses were “yes” (M= 2.02 out of 3, SD= 
0.86). This would suggest that a majority of children recognized that the disagreement 
was regarding a matter that could theoretically be figured out. Among children who 
indicated help was needed, children agreed it was possible that one of the characters 
could need more help than the other roughly half the time (M= 1.43 out of 3, SD=1.01). 
Thus, among children who recognized the disagreement as concerning a knowable truth, 
about half of these children acknowledged that the disagreement may be explained by the 
characters’ differing abilities to access or establish what is true. That is, about a third of 
the time children not only viewed truth as knowable, but were under the impression that 
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differences in people’s ability to construct or access knowledge could explain diverging 
perceptions of truth. 
Children who offered suggested methods for “figuring out” the disagreed-upon 
matter were then asked if their suggested approach could lead to “knowing for sure” 
(Table 10.4).  A common suggestion to “figure it out” was to ask someone. Binomial 
analyses revealed that for objective matters of fact, children were significantly more 
likely to say that asking an expert would result in knowing for sure than not knowing for 
sure, p<0.05. This could not be determined for the Integrated and Subjective domains due 
to low sample sizes of children having suggested asking an expert as a means to “figure it 
out”. Additionally, children did not systematically indicate whether asking a non-expert 
(such as a parent) or other person (e.g. asking the coach if he is nice or mean) would lead 
to knowing for sure.  
Children who suggested turning to reference materials to “figure it out” were 
significantly more likely to indicate that “looking it up” would not necessarily lead to 
“knowing for sure” in the Objective and Integrated domains. Only two children suggested 
“looking it up” for Subjective issues, and only one of these suggested it would lead to 
“knowing for sure”. A few children suggested polls or “other” means (e.g. “rock, paper, 
scissors”) to “figure it out”; however, sample sizes were too small to determine whether 
their judgments of the certainty of knowledge derived from these means were systematic.  
In sum, children suggested a diverse array of means to “figure out” the matter 
being discussed. Generally they varied in their assessment of the certainty of knowledge 
derived from such means. However, children who suggested seeking an objective truth 
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from expert testimony were significantly more likely to say that this would lead to 
“knowing for sure”, rather than not. Similarly, children who suggested investigation, tests 
or observation as a means to “figure it out” were significantly more likely to say it would 
lead to certain, rather than uncertain, knowledge in the Integrated domain. In contrast, 
children who suggested “looking it up” in a book, online, or via a digital assistant (e.g. 
Siri)—which occurred primarily for the Objective and Integrated domains— were 
significantly more likely to say that it would not lead to certain knowledge. 
Table 10.4 
Percentage of children in each vignette type who indicated that one could know for sure 
for suggested means. Analyses run due to sufficient sample size are in bold text. 
Means 
Objective Integrated Subjective 
% N % N % N 
Ask Expert 83** 23 25 4 100 3 
Ask Non-Expert 25 8 44 9 33 3 
Ask Other 43 7 75 4 54 13 
Discuss N/A 0 0 1 N/A 0 
Look Up 26*** 50 0*** 36 50 2 
Investigate 40 5 77* 13 56 9 
Poll N/A 0 0 1 0 1 
Other 83 6 40 5 59 2 
Note. Binomial tests indicate whether children indicated one could “know for sure” above chance. 
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
84 
 
 
 Nature of truth. Finally, children were asked to consider the conflicting claims 
made in the vignette in terms of their possible truth value: “Does someone here have to 
be wrong, or could they both be right? [If both] Could one of them be more right than the 
other, or not really?”. Chi-Squared tests indicated that children were significantly more 
likely to indicate that someone had to be wrong in the Objective vignettes than the 
Subjective or Mixed, X2= 9.33, p<0.001; significantly more likely to indicate that 
speakers could both be right and one couldn’t be more right than the other in the 
Subjective Vignettes than the Objective or Mixed, X2= 28.0, p<0.001; and significantly 
more likely to indicate that both speakers could be right, but one could be more right than 
the other in the Mixed Vignettes than the Objective or Subjective, X2= 20.28, p<0.001. 
Thus, children’s judgments about the truth value of conflicting claims are sensitive to the 
nature of the disagreement. 
 
Figure 10.3. Children’s epistemological stances at baseline suggest that even prior to an 
intervention, their epistemological beliefs and reasoning is diverse, flexible, and context-
dependent (bars represent standard errors). 
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Stance. Children adjusted their epistemological stance by vignette (Figure 10.3). 
Chi squared tests indicated that within the objective domain, Absolutism was 
significantly more prevalent than Evaluativist or Multiplist perspectives; furthermore, 
Evaluativism was significantly more common than Multiplism in this domain, ps<0.05. 
Multiplism was significantly more common than Absolutism in the Subjective domain, 
p<0.05. However, Evaluativism did not occur at rates significantly different from the 
other two perspectives in this domain, ps>0.05. Finally, Evaluativism was significantly 
more common than multiplism common in the Integrated domain, p<0.05; however, 
Absolutism did not occur at rates significantly different from Evaluativism or Multiplism 
in this domain, ps>0.05.  
A series of three one-way-ANOVA analyses did not reveal any significant main 
effects of age on children’s overall tendency to make Absolutist, Multiplist, or 
Evaluativist Judgments across the three vignettes (Table 10.5). 
Table 10.5 
  
Results from three one-way ANOVA analyses examining the effects of age on children’s 
total Absolutist Judgments, Multiplist Judgments, and Evaluativist Judgments 
  
Model Stance Predictor df SS F p Fit 
        
1 Absolutist Age 1 0.27 0.25 0.62 R2   = .005 
2 Multiplist Age 1 0.88 1.85 0.18 R2   = .034 
3 Evaluativist Age 1 0.0031 0.0033 0.95 R2   = .000 
        
Note. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
A series of three Mixed Effects Binary Logistic Regression models were 
conducted to assess the effects of age, vignette type, and age-by-vignette type interactions 
on children’s absolutist, multiplist, or evaluativist judgments (Table 10.5). Mauchly’s test 
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did not indicate any violations of the sphericity assumption, so no corrections were made.  
Table 10.6` 
 
Children’s Absolutist Judgments at Baseline (Fixed Effects) 
  
Predictor b SE p Fit 
(Intercept) -7.142*** 0.01 <.001  
Age: Objective 10.40*** 0.01   
Age: Integrated 8.11*** 0.01 <.001  
Age: Subjective 6.82*** 0.01 <.001  
    Nagelkerke R2=0.51** 
Note. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Absolutist Judgments at Baseline. A mixed-effects binary logistic regression 
model revealed no significant main effect of Age or Vignette Type on Absolutist 
Judgments, ps>0.5. However, there was a significant and large Age-by-Vignette Type 
interaction effect, F(2, 53)=5.04, p<0.001, partial eta2= 0.34. That is, the effects of age on 
children’s tendency to make Absolutist Judgments varied significantly as a function of 
Vignette Type. 
Post-hoc analyses (Tukey’s HSD; see Table 10.7) indicate that older children 
were significantly more likely to make Absolutist Judgments in the Objective scenario 
compared to both the Integrated (p<0.001) and Subjective (p<0.001) vignettes. 
Furthermore, older children were significantly more likely to make Absolutist Judgments 
in the Integrated scenario compared to the Subjective, (p<0.001). Although results from 
the overall ANOVA suggest that older children do not make more Absolutist Judgments 
overall, this mixed-effects model does suggest that with age, Absolutist epistemological 
reasoning is more likely observed in situations that are relatively objective. Put 
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differently, it seems that older children’s absolutism is more flexible or sensitive to 
context than younger children’s. 
Table 10.7 
 
Estimated Marginal Means (Tukey’s HSD) for Absolutist Judgments at Baseline 
 
Contrast estimate SE p 
Objective - Integrated 17.44 *** 2.74 <.001 
Objective - Subjective 26.48 *** 4.03 <.001 
Integrated - Subjective 9.05*** 1.86 <.001 
Note: Results are given on the log odds ratio (not the response) scale. P value adjustment: Tukey 
method for comparing a family of 3 estimates. 
 
Multiplist Judgments at Baseline. A mixed-effects binary logistic regression 
model revealed no significant main or interaction effect of age on children’s Multiplist 
Judgments. However, there was a medium and significant main effect of Vignette Type, 
F(2, 53)= 9.66, p<0.001, partial eta2= 0.35. 
Table 10.8 
Children’s Multiplist Judgments at Baseline (Fixed Effects) 
  
Predictor b SE p Fit 
(Intercept) -8.12* 3.51 <.001  
Integrated 2.71* 1.08 <.05  
Subjective 4.08*** 1.11 <.001  
Age 2.8* 0.46 <.05  
    R2=0.14*** 
Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfn indicates degrees of freedom. R2 indicates 
Nagelkerke pseudo R squared. 
 
Post-hoc analyses (Tukey’s HSD; see Table 10.9) indicate that children were 
significantly less likely to make Multiplist Judgments in the Objective scenario compared 
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to the Integrated and Subjective scenarios. They were also significantly less likely to 
make Multiplist Judgments in the Integrated scenario compared to the Subjective. Thus, 
children—regardless of age—were generally more likely to make Multiplist 
epistemological judgments as a function of the perceived subjectivity of the discussion. 
Table 10.9 
 
Estimated Marginal Means (Tukey’s HSD) for Multiplist Judgments at Baseline 
Contrast estimate SE p 
Objective - Integrated -2.71 * 1.08 <.05 
Objective - Subjective -4.08 *** 1.11 <.001 
Integrated - Subjective -1.37 * 0.51 <.05 
Note: Results are given on the log odds ratio (not the response) scale. P value adjustment: Tukey 
method for comparing a family of 3 estimates. 
 
Evaluativist Judgments at Baseline. A mixed-effects binary logistic regression 
model revealed no significant main or interaction effect of Age on Evaluativist 
Judgments, ps>0.5. Interestingly, Integrated Vignette Type was marginally significantly 
predictive of children’s Evaluativist Judgments. However, the overall model featuring 
Vignette Type as a predictor was not significant. 
Table 10.10 
 
Children’s Evaluativist Judgments at Baseline (Fixed Effects) 
Predictor b SE p Fit 
(Intercept) 0.06 0.34 .98  
Objective -.70 0.44 ns  
Subjective -.52 0.43 ns  
Age -0.02 0.37 ns  
    R2=0.05 
Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfn indicates degrees of freedom. R2 indicates 
Nagelkerke pseudo R squared. 
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Notably, nearly 40% of children held evaluativist perspectives in the subjective 
domain, despite work indicating that even adults struggle to acknowledge how matters of 
taste can be evaluated based on some objective criteria (e.g. judging music based on 
pitch; Kuhn, et al. 2000). Importantly, baseline results indicate that children’s 
epistemological understanding is diverse, context-dependent, and at times highly 
sophisticated. 
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Chapter 11: Intervention 
Throughout the three Intervention Phase vignettes, some of children’s responses 
changed significantly compared to the pretest. 
Making Sense of Disagreements. Paired t-tests indicated that the discussed 
disagreements “made sense” to children at similar rates to the baseline phase, p=0.46. 
However, there was a marked decrease in the number of children who said that it did not 
make sense to disagree about the topic, t(54)= 1.22, p=0.01; and an increase in the 
number of children who said that it maybe made sense t(54)=-2.8, p=0.007. Thus, 
children who had previously indicated that the disagreement in the vignettes did not make 
sense were increasingly ambivalent about this in the Intervention Phase. 
Figuring it out. Paired t-tests indicated that there was a significant increase in the 
number of times children indicated that the characters would need help to figure out the 
disagreement (p=0.05). Thus, in the intervention phase an even larger majority of 
children recognized that the disagreement was regarding a matter that could theoretically 
be figured out. 
Nature of truth.  Children’s considerations of the truth value of conflicting claims 
differed significantly from the Pretest Phase. Children were significantly less likely to say 
someone had to be wrong, and significantly more likely to say that both could be right, 
with one being more so than the other, t(54)= 1.14, p<0.001. The proportion of children 
who indicated that both speakers could be equally, but not relatively, right was not 
significantly different. 
Epistemological Stance. Along these lines, children’s epistemological stances 
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were significantly different from baseline in the Intervention Phase. Paired t-tests indicate 
that overall, absolutist judgments were significantly reduced, t(54)=2.98, p=0.004; 
multiplists judgments were significantly reduced, t(54)= 2.82, p=0.007; and as intended, 
evaluativist judgments increased significantly, t(54)= -4.54, p<0.001. 
 
Figure 11.1. Proportion of Children’s Epistemological Judgments by Phase. 
Engagement. Children’s engagement for each vignette (Objective: M= 1.15 out 
of 2, SD= 0.57; Mixed: M= 1.37, SD= 0.64; Subjective: M= 1.40, SD = 0.61) was 
generally moderate-to-high. Furthermore, their total engagement (M= 4.02 out of 6, SD= 
1.39), was significantly greater than chance, t(45)= 4.934, p<0.001. Furthermore, 
evidence confirms that the effectiveness of the intervention was a function of child 
engagement. For example, engagement in the objective vignette was negatively 
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correlated with taking an absolutist stance in this domain (r= -0.314, p<0.05), and an 
evaluativist stance (r= 0.333, p<0.05). Similarly, engagement in the Mixed vignettes was 
negatively correlated with taking an absolutist (r= -0.214, p<0.05) or multiplist stance (r= 
-0.284, p<0.05) in this domain, and positively correlated with an evaluativist stance (r= 
0.530, p<0.05). Furthermore, engagement in the Subjective vignettes was negatively 
correlated with multiplist stances in this domain, (r= -0.386, p<0.05), and positively 
correlated with evaluativist stances (r= 0.39, p<0.05). 
Engagement was also positively correlated with children’s tendency to suggest 
testing, observation and investigation as a means to “figure out” disputes in the 
Subjective domain (r=0.373, p<0.05). Overall engagement was also correlated an 
increase in children’s assertion that disagreements did not make sense between the 
pretest and intervention, r= 0.32, p<0.05; and a decrease in children’s assertion that both 
speakers could be right, but not more so than the other, r -0.349, p<0.05. 
Engagement was also correlated with responses in the Pretest calibration trials. 
For example, children who had more frequently indicated that “both” reasoners had the 
best way of thinking were generally less engaged in the Intervention Phase, r= -0.34, 
p<0.05. Similarly, children who had more frequently indicated that the overconfident 
reasoner had the best way of thinking were generally less engaged in the Intervention’s 
Objective vignette, r= -0.36, p<0.05. Thus, children who had found the Overconfident 
reasoner to be equally or more competent than her well-Calibrated counterpart were not 
as prone to accepting or elaborate upon the experimenters’ evaluativist epistemological 
scaffolding later on. 
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Notably, children’s engagement in the intervention phase was unrelated to child 
sex, family demographic factors, child cognitive skills (EF and IQ), and parent factors 
including parent epistemological understanding, authoritarian values, social conformity, 
and need for cognition. However, it was correlated with child age, such that older 
children were more engaged, r= 0.33, p<0.05.  
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Chapter 12: Experimental Results 
 In this chapter, we test the effects of the epistemological intervention on children’s 
informal critical thinking (calibration trials) and their epistemological understanding 
(vignettes).  
 Calibration. As in the Pretest, for each Posttest calibration trial, children were 
asked to make a prediction based on observed data and rate their own certainty on a 3-
point-scale. After the intervention, children were significantly less likely to indicate that 
they were “very” sure (M=0.51 out of 3, SD= 0.11), t(53)= 8.33, p<0.001. In contrast, 
children were significantly more likely to say they were “not so” sure (M= 1.22 out of 3, 
SD=0.69), t(53) = -7.67, p<0.001. 
As in the Pretest Phase, a score was calculated to represent the extent to which 
children’s certainty was aligned with the strength of observed statistical evidence. 
Children were awarded a point if they were “very sure” in the 100% trial, “kinda sure” in 
the 75% trial, and “not so sure” in the 50% trial. Children were given partial credit in the 
form of half a point when they were “kinda sure” in the 100% trial, “not so sure” in the 
75% trial, and “kinda sure” in the 50% trial. Points were totaled for each child’s 
Calibration Score, which could range from 0 to 3 (M=1.14, SD=0.15). Despite changes in 
the frequency of “very sure” and “not so sure” responses, the children’s calibration scores 
were not significantly different after the intervention, t(53)= 0.57, p= 0.6. This suggests 
that although children were less certain in the posttest, this was a general effect not due to 
an increased sensitivity to the statistical data. 
Children’s evaluations of speaker reasoning were also analyzed as in the Pretest. 
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After each trial participants were asked “Who has the best way of thinking?”. Although 
children did not select the Calibrator or Overconfident speaker at significantly different 
rates, a paired t-test indicated children were significantly more likely to indicate that 
“both” had the best way of thinking in the Posttest than they did in the Pretest, t(53)= 
2.604, p<0.05.  Similarly, related samples chi-squared analyses revealed that children 
were not significantly different in their indications that the Calibrator, Overconfident or 
Both speakers knows more; or that they liked the particular speaker more or less after the 
intervention, ps>0.05. 
 Vignettes. Paired t-test analyses were used to assess whether there were significant 
differences in children’s responses to the vignette questions after the intervention. 
Overwhelmingly, children’s responses did not vary significantly from those at pretest, 
with one exception: children were significantly more likely to suggest asking an expert at 
posttest, t(53)= 2.84, p<0.01. After the intervention, children were also marginally more 
likely to say that the disagreement did not make sense, t(53)= 1.81, p=0.08.  
 Epistemological Stance. Although the intervention significantly reduced absolutist 
judgments and increased evaluativist judgments in real time, these effects did not appear 
to carry over into the posttest phase (Figure 12.1). Betwee pre- and posttest, there was no 
siginificant difference between childrens’ absolutist judgments, t(53)=0.98, p=0.4; 
multiplist judgments, t(53)=-0.63, p=0.5; or evaluativist judgments, t(53)=1.23, p=0.2. 
 Cognitive Factors. In order to better understand whether individual differences in 
children’s executive functioning and/or verbal IQ were related to the effects of an 
epistemological intervention on their learning, each target measure in the Calibration and 
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Vignette trials was used to calculate a Delta score. This score represented the individual 
child’s differential response in the Pretest and Posttest on each given measure, with a 
positive score representing an intervention-related increase, and a negative score 
representing a decrease. 
Figure 12.1.  Intervention (1) significantly reduces absolutist judgments; (2) increases 
evaluativist judgments, and has no significant effect on multiplist judgments; however, its 
effects to do not carry over into the post-test. 
 
 For the most part, effects of the intervention were unrelated to cognitive factors. 
However, children’s IQ was positively correlated with an increase in children’s 
acknowledgement in the vignette trials that although both speakers could be right, one 
could be “more right” than the other, r= 0.28, p=0.04. Children’s IQ was also marginally 
significantly correlated with an increase in children’s acknowledgement that the 
Calibrator “knows more”, r= 0.25, p=0.07.  
 To assess the predictive power of IQ after controlling for EF, linear regression 
models featuring both covariates were run. Verbal IQ had a unique, small, and marginally 
97 
 
significant effect on children’s increased tendency to say that two disagreeing speakers 
could be right, but one could be “more right”, post-intervention, F(1, 53)= 3.22, p=0.07, 
partial eta2= 0.06. Similarly, Verbal IQ had a unique, small, and marginally significant 
effect on children’s increased tendency to credit the Calibrator with more knowledge 
post-intervention, F(1, 53)= 3.62, p=0.06, partial eta2= 0.05. 
 Engagement. Perhaps surprisingly, children’s engagement levels in the 
Intervention phase were unrelated to any epistemological changes between the Pretest 
and Posttest phases. They were also unrelated to any changes in children’s responses 
during the Calibration trials.  
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Chapter 13: Individual Differences in Calibration and Judgments Thereof 
 What factors predict individual differences in children’s learning and 
epistemological stances? In this chapter I overview the models that theoretically and 
actually account for the most variance in the observed data at baseline, as well as the 
observed effects of the intervention. 
Individual Differences in Children’s Calibration 
 Predictors for the theoretical model of children’s own calibration include child age, 
parent factors (need for cognition), epistemological factors (children’s evaluativism) and 
cognitive factors (MEFS).  However, none of these factors was a significant predictor of 
individual differences in children’s calibration, and the overall model accounted for only 
about 5% of observed variance (Figure 13.1). 
Table 13.1 
Summary of Theoretical Regression Model for Children’s Calibration Score (N = 54) 
Predictor b r Fit 
(Intercept) 0.87   
Age -0.05 -.03  
Parent Need for 
Cognition 
0.01 .13  
Child Evaluativism -0.08 -.11  
EF (MEFS) 0.01 .15  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .050 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. r represents the zero-order correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
 The model that best explained children’s ability to adjust their own certainty in 
response to the data was similar. If featured parent education, parent need for cognition, 
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parent absolutism, and executive functioning. Overall, this model explained about 49% of 
the variance in children’s calibration scores. 
Table 13.2 
Summary of Best Fitting Regression Model for Children’s Calibration Score  (N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
(Intercept) -1.39 .62  
Parent Education .60*** .07  
Parent Need for 
Cognition 
.13** .004  
Parent Absolutism -.33*** .001  
EF (MEFS) .20*** .005  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .49* 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. r represents the zero-order correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Children whose parents’ had a high educational attainment were significantly 
more likely to adjust the certainty of their predictions in accordance with the strength of 
observed statistical data. Similarly, well-calibrated children were significantly more 
likely to have parents with a high need for cognition, or a tendency to enjoy engaging in 
effortful thinking and problem-solving. Furthermore, well-calibrated children were 
significantly less likely to have absolutist parents, and significantly more likely to have 
stronger executive functioning skills. 
 Preference for Calibrator. Predictors for the theoretical model of children’s 
preference for the Calibrator (composite score) include parent factors (evaluativism, 
authoritarianism, need for cognition) as well as children’s personal (Age) and cognitive 
factors (EF, IQ). This model accounted for about 19% of the observed variance (Table 
13.3). 
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Table 13.3 
Summary of Theoretical Regression Model for Calibrator Composite Score  (N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
(Intercept) -0.11   
IQ -0.01 .02  
MEFS 0.02 .01  
N4C -0.00 .02  
Authoritarianism 0.11 .04  
Parent Evaluativism -0.02 .13  
Child Evaluativism -0.10 .17  
Age 0.62+ .17  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .193 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. r represents the zero-order correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
 Instead, the model that best fit the data (about 27% of the variance explained), 
featured parent factors (parent multiplism) as well as children’s epistemological 
(Absolutism at baseline), personal (Age) and cognitive factors (EF). Although age and EF 
were individually marginally significant, together these factors contributed significantly 
to the model. The model suggests that children who preferred the Calibrator tended to be 
older, had better executive functioning skills, made fewer absolutist judgments, and had 
parents who made more multiplist judgments. 
 Examining children’s preference for the overconfident speaker, the theoretical 
model again included parent factors (absolutism, authoritarianism, need for cognition) as 
well as children’s personal (age), epistemological (absolutism) and cognitive factors (EF, 
IQ). The theoretical model explained about 20% of the variance in children’s preference 
for the Overconfident speaker, and suggested that children’s absolutism and age were 
good predictors. 
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Table 13.4 
Summary of Best Fitting Regression Model for Calibrator Composite Score (N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
Age 0.21+ .02  
MEFS Score (EF) 0.30+ .12  
Parent Multiplism 0.30* .03  
Child Absolutism 
 -0.27*       ……12 
 
   
Nagelkerke R2= .268* 
Note. B represents unstandardized regression weights. R represents the zero-order correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Table 13.5 
Summary of Theoretical Model for Overconfident Composite Score (N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
(Intercept) 1.30   
Age -0.08+ .001  
Parent 
Absolutism 
0.01 .001  
Parent Need for 
Cognition 
0.00 .01  
Parent 
Authoritarianism 
-0.05 .02  
Child Absolutism 0.12* .001  
EF (MEFS) -0.00 .002  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .200 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. r represents the zero-order correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
 The best fitting model for children’s Overconfident Composite Score featured child 
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age, parent multiplism, children’s executive functioning, and children’s absolutism. It 
suggests that children who preferred the Overconfident speaker tended to be younger, 
have lower EF skills, made more absolutist judgments, and had parents who made more 
multiplist judgments. 
Table 13.6 
Summary of Best Fitting Model for Overconfident Composite Score  (N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
(Intercept) 1.44   
Age -0.38** .002  
Parent Multiplism -0.30** .01  
EF (MEFS) -0.26* .01  
Child Absolutism 0.12+ .02  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .321* 
    
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. r represents the zero-order correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Examining children’s preference for both speakers—or perhaps their lack of a 
preference for either—the theoretical model again included parent factors (multiplism, 
need for cognition, authoritarianism) as well as children’s personal (age, multiplism) and 
cognitive factors (EF, IQ). The overall model accounted for about 21% of children’s 
preference for both speakers, with parent need for cognition and children’s executive 
functioning being significant predictors. 
 The best fitting model for children’s Both Composite Score explained about 36% of 
the variance in children’s preferences both speakers. It featured children’s engagement 
during the intervention, parent evaluativism, and parent need for cognition as significant 
predictors, as well as children’s executive functioning as a marginally significant 
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predictor. The model suggests that children who preferred both speakers tended to have 
lower EF skills, were less engaged later in the intervention phase, had parents who made 
more multiplist judgments, and had parents with a relatively low need for cognition. 
Table 13.7 
Summary of Theoretical Model for Both Composite Score (N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
(Intercept) 0.54   
Age -0.14 .01  
Parent Multiplism 0.04 .003  
Need for Cognition -0.01** .01  
Parent 
Authoritarianism 
-0.10 .02  
EF (MEFS) -0.01* .001  
Child Multiplism 0.05 .02  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .209 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. r represents the zero-order correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Table 13.8 
Summary of Best Fitting Model for Both Composite Score (N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
(Intercept) 0.15   
Engagement Score -0.62** .02  
Parent Multiplism 0.07* .02  
Parent Need for Cognition -0.01* .01  
EF (MEFS) -0.01+ .02  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .362** 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. r represents the zero-order correlation.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
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Interim Summary  
Thus far, we have established that individual differences in children’s judgments 
of speakers on the basis of their calibration are linked to individual differences in 
cognitive factors, epistemological beliefs, parents’ epistemological and cognitive factors, 
and in the case of children’s own calibration, even parent education (Table 13.9). 
Interestingly, children’s preferences for the Calibrator and Overconfident speaker were 
explained by opposite patterns of factors. While children’s preference for the Calibrator 
was positively associated with age, EF skills, and parent multiplism, these were all 
negatively associated with a preference for the Overconfident speaker. Furthermore, 
while children’s preference for the Calibrator was negatively associated with their 
tendency to make Absolutist judgments, the reverse was true for children with a 
preference for the Overconfident speaker. 
Like children who preferred the Overconfident speaker, those who did not have a 
preference for either speaker (choosing “both”) tended to have lower EF scores. 
However, unlike children with a preference for the Overconfident speaker, the parents of 
children who chose “both” tended to make more Multiplist Judgments. Two additional 
factors were found to be negatively predictive of children’s preference for “both”: child 
engagement later in the intervention phase, and parent need for cognition. That is, 
children who indicated “both” speakers had the “best way of thinking”, “knew more”, 
and were more “likeable” would go on to be more resistant to experimenter suggestions 
during the intervention phase, and their parents tended to be less interested in engaging in 
effortful thinking and problem-solving. 
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Table 13.9 
Summary of Significant Predictors of Individual Differences in Children’s Speaker 
Judgments 
 Age EF Engagement Absolutism Multiplism Evaluativism N4C 
Calibrator + +  Child: - Parent: +   
Overconfident - -  Child: + Parent: -   
Both  - -  Parent: +  - 
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Chapter 14: Individual Differences in Epistemological Stance 
Absolutist Epistemology at Baseline 
 A mixed-effects binary logistic regression model was the best fitting model of 
child Absolutism, explaining about 33% of the variance (Table 14.1). This model 
included contextual factors (Vignette Type), parent factors (Absolutism, 
Authoritarianism), child personal factors (age), and cognitive factors (EF).  
Table 14.1 
  
Best Fitting Model of Children’s Absolutist Judgments at Baseline by Vignette 
 
Predictor b   SE Fit 
(Intercept) 17.87 0.002  
Integrated -1.48**   0.002  
Subjective -6.74*** 0.002  
Age -3.08*** 0.002  
EF (MEFS) -1.14** 0.001  
Parent Absolutism 9.99*** 0.012  
Parent Authoritarianism 4.59*** 0.002  
MEFS: Integrated .09** 0.002  
MEFS: Subjective .004 0.002  
    
   R2   = .44 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
As already established, children were significantly more likely to make absolutist 
judgments in the objective domain, and significantly less likely in the integrated and 
subjective domains. Children who made more Absolutist Judgments also tended to be 
younger and had relatively weak EF skills. Their parents were more likely to make 
Absolutist Judgments and have Authoritarian values. Furthermore, there was a significant 
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MEFS-by-Vignette Type interaction effect (Figure 14.1), such that the negative effect of 
EF skills on Absolutist Judgments was strongest in the Objective domain, and 
significantly weaker in the Integrated domains. There was no significant effect of EF on 
Absolutism in the Subjective domain. Thus, children with higher EF skills were 
significantly less likely to make absolutist judgments in the Objective vignette, EF made 
no difference on absolutist judgments in the Subjective domain. Furthermore, EF had a 
significant but small effect on absolutism in the Integrated domain. 
 
Figure 14. 1. There was a significant EF by Vignette Type Interaction Effect on 
Children’s Absolutist Judgments at Baseline. 
 
Multiplist Epistemology at Baseline 
 A mixed-effects binary logistic regression model was also conducted to understand 
individual differences in children’s multiplist epistemology, and it was found to explain 
O 
I 
S 
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about 16% of the variance (Table 14.2). Predictors included vignette type, cognitive 
factors (EF), parent factors (absolutism, authoritarianism) as well as children’s age. The 
model indicated that children who made more multiplist judgments tended to be older 
and have less absolutist parents. Furthermore, as already established, children were more 
likely to make multplist judgments in the Objective domain, and more likely to do so in 
the Subjective domain. 
Table 14.2 
 
Best Fitting Model of Children’s Multiplist Judgments by Vignette 
Predictor b   SE Fit 
(Intercept) 15.25**   
Age 0.73+ .004  
Objective -2.7* .03  
Subjective 1.34** .001  
Parent Absolutism -0.25+ .05  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .16 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Evaluativist Epistemology at Baseline 
A mixed-effects binary logistic regression model was also conducted to 
understand individual differences in children’s evaluativist epistemology, and it was 
found to explain about 24% of the variance (Table 14.3). It featured parent education, 
Vignette Type, and Parent Absolutism interaction as predictors. Children whose parent(s) 
had not attained a Bachelor’s degree or higher were significantly less likely to make 
Evaluativist judgments at baseline. Furthermore, parent absolutism was significantly 
negatively predictive of evaluativist judgments.  
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Table 14.3 
Summary of Best Fitting Regression Model for Child Evaluativism at Baseline (N = 54) 
Predictor b   SE Fit 
(Intercept)    
Parent Absolutism -1.54** 0.74  
Parent Education -0.9** 0.04  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .26 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
Interim Summary 
Thus far, we have established that individual differences in children’s 
epistemological beliefs are linked to a number of individual differences in cognitive 
factors, epistemological beliefs, parents’ epistemological understanding, and vignette 
type (Table 14.4).  
Children tended to display an absolutist epistemological understanding most often 
in the Objective Vignette, and least commonly in the subjective domain. Children who 
tended to make more absolutist judgments were relatively young, were had relatively less 
educated parents, and had relatively authoritarian parents, and relatively absolutist 
judgments. Furthermore, children with weaker executive functioning skills were more 
likely to have absolutist beliefs, especially regarding matters of resolvable fact. That is, 
children’s executive functioning skills acted as a moderator, amplifying the effects of 
vignette type.  
Children tended to display a multiplist epistemological understanding most often 
in the subjective domain, and least commonly in the objective domain. Furthermore, 
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children who tended to make more multiplist judgments were relatively older, and their 
parents were less likely to display absolutist epistemological understanding. Finally, 
children who tended to display more evaluativist epistemological understanding had 
parents who were less likely to make absolutist judgments, and less likely to have a 
parent with a doctoral degree.  
Notably, parent absolutism appeared as a common thread explaining children’s 
epistemological understanding, being positively associated with children’s own 
absolutism, but negatively associated with judgments in which the subjective dimension 
of knowing is acknowledged (Integrated and Subjective domains). 
Table 14.4 
Summary of Significant Parent (P) and Child (C) Factors Predictive of Individual 
Differences in Children’s Speaker Judgments (N=54) 
 
 Age Absolutism Education Vignette 
Type 
MEFS Authoritarianism 
Absolutist - P: + - O: + 
I: - 
S: - 
- 
I: -  
O: - 
+ 
Multiplist + P: -  O: - 
S: + 
  
Evaluativist  P: - +    
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Chapter 15: Individual Differences in Effects of Intervention on Target Variables 
 For each target variable, a “Delta” score was calculated representing the difference 
between the number of children’s responses at baseline and the posttest. Although there 
was no overall effect of the intervention in the posttest, perhaps a subset of individuals 
did benefit. Here we examine which, if any, set of predictors explain differences in 
children’s responsiveness to the intervention. 
Table 15.1 
  
Best Fitting Model for Change in Children’s Calibration (Pre vs. Post; N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
(Intercept) 3.51** 1.24  
Baseline 
Calibration Score 
0.63** .14  
Age -0.64** .17  
Parent Multiplism -1.20+ .69  
Parent Multiplism: 
MEFS 
0.11+ .01  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .419** 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. * 
indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
 Calibration. The best fitting model for changes in children’s calibration explained 
about 42% of the variance in children’s Calibration Delta Score. The model included 
children’s baseline calibration score, age, parent multiplism, and a parent multiplism-by-
child EF interaction effect. It suggests that children’s Baseline Calibration Score is 
significantly predictive of their Calibration Delta Score, such that children who were 
relatively strong calibrators to begin with were more likely to show further 
improvements. Furthermore, it indicates that younger children were more likely to show 
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improvements in their calibration to statistical evidence as a result of the intervention. 
Overall, children whose parents tended to make multiplist judgments were less likely to 
show improvements in their calibration as a result of the intervention. However, the 
significant parent multiplism-by-child EF interaction effect indicates that among children 
with more multiplistic parents, those with stronger executive functioning skills were more 
likely show improvements in Calibration. 
Table 15.2 
Best Fitting Model for Change in Judgments of Calibrator (Pre vs. Post; N = 54) 
Predictor b SE Fit 
(Intercept) 0.25 .20  
Composite C -0.49** .13  
Baseline Calibration 
Score 
-0.89* .47  
Baseline Calibration 
Score: MEFS 
0.01+ .004  
   Nagelkerke R2   = .266** 
    
Note. b represents unstandardized regression weights. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
 Judgments of Calibrator. The best fitting model included children’s baseline 
composite score for the calibrator, cognitive factors (MEFS), and personal factors (age, 
engagement, calibration). As expected, children’s Composite Score of Calibrator 
Preference at Baseline was significantly negatively predictive of children’s post-
intervention increase in Calibrator Preference (ceiling effect). Furthermore, the model 
indicates that children who were poorly calibrated at baseline showed significant 
improvements in their judgments of the Calibrator. Finally, there was a marginally 
significant Calibration Score-by-EF interaction, such that children who were relatively 
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well-calibrated were more likely to show an improvement in their Calibrator judgments if 
they had stronger EF skills. That is, children who already had relevant competencies—
calibration and cognitive control—benefited more from the epistemological intervention 
than their peers in a critical thinking context. 
 Evaluativist Judgments. The model that best fit the data (about 47% of the 
variance explained) featured parent absolutism, children’s MEFS scores (EF), children’s 
evaluativism at baseline, children’s calibration score at baseline, and children’s tendency 
to indicate they were “very” sure (an index of overconfidence rather than generally poor 
calibration). Furthermore, two factors in this model individually accounted for a 
significant amount of the variance in children’s change in evaluativism: children’s 
tendency to be “very sure” in the calibration trials at baseline, and their evaluativist 
tendencies at baseline. Specifically, children who tended to say they were “very sure” 
about their predictions were more likely to show an increase in evaluativist judgments as 
a result of the intervention, and children who originally made more evaluativist 
judgments were unsurprisingly less likely to benefit from the intervention (ceiling effect). 
Table 15.3 
Summary of Best Fitting Regression Model for Change in Evaluativism (N = 54) 
Variable Standardized B SE Sig. 
Child “Very Sure” at Baseline* 0.294 0.230 0.016 
Child Evaluativism at Baseline** -0.680 0.076 0.001 
 Nagelkerke R2=0.469** 
*p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01. 
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Interim Summary. 
Thus far, we have established that individual differences in children’s 
responsiveness to the intervention are linked to a number of cognitive factors, 
epistemological beliefs, parents’ epistemological understanding, and more (Table 15.3).  
Children’s own ability to adjust the certainty of their predictions was more likely 
to improve post-intervention if they were relatively young, their parents were less likely 
to display multiplist epistemological understanding, and if their parents were relatively 
multiplistic they had stronger executive functioning skills. 
Children’s increased preference for the Calibrator overall was significantly 
negatively related to the Baseline Calibration Score; that is children who were relatively 
poor calibrators at baseline were more likely to show an increased preference for the 
Calibrator after the intervention. Furthermore, children who were relatively good 
calibrators and had strong EF skills showed an improved ability to preferentially indicate 
that the Calibrator was the more competent reasoner after the intervention. Finally, 
children who were already relatively discriminating in their preference for the Calibrator 
at baseline were more likely to show an increased preference for this speaker at posttest. 
Finally, children’s ability to recognize the integrated objective and subjective 
nature of knowledge—that is, display an evaluativist epistemological understanding—at 
baseline was significantly negatively predictive of their improved epistemological 
understanding. Put differently, children who were less evaluativist at baseline were more 
likely to increase their evaluativist judgments after the intervention, likely because they 
had the most “room for improvement”. Children who were overconfident in their 
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predictions—that is, they tended to say they were “Very Sure” the box would light up—
were also more likely to display an increase their evaluativist reasoning after the 
intervention. 
Table 15.4 
Summary of Significant Parent (P) and Child (C) Factors Predictive of Individual 
Differences in Children’s Responses to the Intervention (N=54) 
 
 
 
  
 Age MEFS Multiplis
t EU at 
Baseline 
Evaluativist 
EU at 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Calibration 
Skills 
“Very 
Sure” at 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Calibrator 
Preference 
∆Calibration 
Skills 
- Parent 
Multiplism* 
EF: + 
P: -  +   
∆ Calibrator 
Preference 
 Baseline 
Calibration* 
EF: + 
  -  + 
∆Evaluativist 
EU 
   -  +  
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Part IV: Discussion 
As reviewed, this work represents an opportunity to address four major gaps in 
the literature on personal epistemology: 1) the study of epistemological understanding 
and critical thinking in children as young as six; 2)  the lack of experimental work on 
causal mechanisms of epistemological development, particularly those that pertain to 
everyday social experiences (e.g. conversations with parents or teachers); 3) the lack of 
study designs that allow for causal inferences about effects of epistemological 
perspectives on learning and critical thinking; 4) the limited examination of third 
variables that could partially or completely account for the predictive relations between 
personal epistemology and learning (e.g. executive functioning). 
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Chapter 16: Early Epistemological Understanding 
 Baseline phase findings indicate that there is considerable inter- and intra-
individual variation in 6- and 7-year-olds’ philosophies of knowledge, which are 
reflective of context, cognitive skills, and parents’ epistemological values. Children’s 
responses to specific questions during the vignette-centered interview suggest that 
children are aware of, and understand, the existence of diverging perspectives. 
Furthermore, a majority of children recognized that the disagreement was regarding a 
matter of knowable truth, and about a third of the time they recognized that differences in 
people’s ability to construct or access knowledge could explain diverging perceptions of 
truth.  
Children also displayed sensitivity to the relatively objective or subjective nature 
of the disagreement in their suggested means to “figure it out”. For example, children 
were particularly likely to suggest asking an expert in the Objective domain, and 
indicated that this would lead to certain knowledge at rates significantly greater than 
chance. Finally, children’s epistemological stance was determined by their recognition of 
the subjective, objective or integrated nature of knowledge. As a group, children adjusted 
their epistemological stance—coded holistically based on their body of responses and 
explanations—depending on the vignette: absolutism was significantly more prevalent in 
the objective domain, multiplism was most common in the subjective domain, and 
evaluativism in the mixed domain. This is fitting, as Absolutist epistemology involves 
recognition of the objective dimension of knowledge and rejection of the subjective 
dimension, and would therefore be “easiest” to apply to matters of resolvable fact. 
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Similarly, Multiplist epistemology is the recognition of the subjective dimension of 
knowledge and rejection of the objective dimension, and would be “easiest” to apply to 
matters of opinion or personal taste. Similarly, the integrated vignettes would be the 
“easiest” to apply Evaluativist thinking to. 
Importantly, these findings indicate that children not only have a rich and diverse 
set of epistemological beliefs and reasoning, but are also capable of far more 
sophisticated and flexible EU than they have been credited for in most theoretical models 
(e.g. Kuhn, et al, 2000; KS Kitchener & King, 1981). Rather than behave as strict 
objectivists, most children acknowledged the subjective dimension of knowing in at least 
one vignette. Impressively, nearly 40% of children held evaluativist perspectives in the 
subjective domain, despite work indicating that even adults struggle to acknowledge how 
matters of taste can be evaluated based on some objective criteria (e.g. judging music 
based on pitch; Kuhn, et al. 2000). 
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Chapter 17: Early Critical Thinking 
Children were presented with two speakers who were asked to make predictions 
about the causal efficacy of an item after observing the efficacy of four items from the 
same set. One speaker, the Calibrator, adjusted the certainty of her predictions in 
correspondence with the strength of the data: with ambiguous data (50% effective), she 
was appropriately “not so sure”, but with deterministic data (100% effective) she was 
“very sure”. In contrast, the Overconfident speaker was always “very sure” of her 
predictions regardless of the evidence. This was a particularly challenging task given that 
unlike previous studies on calibration (e.g. Tenney, et al., 2011), children had no 
information about the accuracy of each informant’s predictions. Thus, they could only 
rely on their tracking of the data, speaker statements, and the correspondence between 
these to make their judgments. 
Despite these challenges, most children did discriminate between the speakers, 
significantly favoring the Calibrator compared to the Overconfident speaker, and 
marginally significantly favoring the Calibrator over “Both”. Due to the low rate of errors 
in recalling events, these preferences cannot be attributed to children’s inattention, 
misunderstanding, or memory of events. This replicates previous findings suggesting that 
6- and 7-year-old’s evaluations of reasoners are reflective of individual differences in 
their epistemological perspectives, and those of their parents (Suárez & Koenig, in press; 
Suárez & Koenig, in prep). Here, we were able to extend these findings by examining 
how an explicit measure of children’s EU maps onto individual differences in their 
evaluations of reasoners, as well as establish that the predictive relation between parent 
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and child EU was not explained solely by individual differences in children’s verbal 
intelligence or executive functioning skills.  
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Chapter 18: Causal Mechanisms in Epistemological Development 
 Here, we hypothesized that EU develops in part due to exposure to parents’ own 
epistemological beliefs and reasoning, as well as epistemological “scaffolding” that 
parents may provide. Thus, the experimental treatment here consisted of a dyadic 
interaction with the experimenter in which: (1) evaluativist expressions were made by the 
experimenter and encouraged in children; (2) children were provided with opportunities 
to consider both the subjectivity and objectivity of knowledge; (3) children were asked to 
generate ideas about how various types of claims may be constructed or justified, and 
evaluate the quality and certainty of resulting knowledge as a scientist would; (4) 
children were encouraged to consider ways in which diverging perspectives can be 
reconciled, evaluated, and validated as a scientist would. 
 During the intervention phase, children were significantly more likely to reason 
about the nature of knowledge in an evaluativist fashion, and significantly less likely to 
express absolutist or multiplist perspectives. Thus, this intervention was effective in real 
time as a way to support the emergence of more sophisticated epistemological thought. 
Furthermore, at posttest, when children were asked if the disagreements in the vignettes 
“made sense” they were significantly less likely to say “yes”, and significantly more 
likely to say that they “maybe”. Thus, the intervention caused children to become 
increasingly ambivalent about whether it “makes sense” to offer two conflicting claims. 
Furthermore, the intervention resulted in children being more likely to recognize that the 
characters in the vignettes would benefit from help “figuring it out”, suggesting that 
exposure to the epistemological scaffolding made them more aware of the resolvable 
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nature of the epistemological conflict. Strikingly, after the intervention children who 
scored relatively high on the measure of verbal IQ were also more likely to recognize that 
conflicting claims could simultaneously have some validity or truth value, with one being 
“more right” than the other.  
Thus, children did become more evaluativist in their valuing of the need to justify 
claims, recognition that claims can be evaluated based on their relative merits, and 
perhaps even their comfort with recognizing the ambiguity inherent in disagreement. 
However, as a group, children’s epistemological stance (determined using their body of 
responses—and explanations behind their responses) was unchanged, as pre-and post-test 
measures of epistemological beliefs were not significantly different.  
Despite this, there were children who benefitted more than others from the 
epistemological intervention, suggesting that there were carry-over effects to the posttest 
for some children. Notably, children who became more evaluativist at posttest were 
significantly more likely to be overconfident in their causal predictions, and significantly 
less likely to have made evaluativist judgments at pretest; thus, this intervention was 
successful for children who were more “in need” of it. 
However, the effects of the intervention on children’s calibration and evaluations 
thereof were not necessarily beneficial. Despite changes in the frequency of “very sure” 
and “not so sure” responses, the children’s calibration scores were not significantly 
different after the intervention, indicating that although children were generally less 
certain in the posttest, they were not better calibrated. That is, their uncertainty was not 
solely in the face of ambiguous statistical data. Furthermore, after the intervention 
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children were more likely to say that “both” speakers had the best way of thinking. Thus, 
it seems that children were generally less confident and discriminating in their social 
learning as a result of the intervention. 
Put together, these results do support the conclusion that interacting with an adult 
in an epistemologically supportive way does lead to modest changes in their 
epistemological understanding and critical thinking. However, many questions remain 
unanswered and should be addressed in the future. First, it is not clear which aspect(s) of 
the epistemological intervention drove these changes. Second, this interaction was 
intensive and short-term; how well do these results represent effects of the brief and 
continuous long-term exposure to epistemological conversation children receive every 
day from parents and teachers? Third, if EU supports critical thinking, why did the 
epistemological intervention lead to an increase in children’s preference for “both” (or 
neither)? Fourth, what is breadth and duration of the intervention’s effects on children’s 
EU and critical thinking? Fifth, how effective would this intervention be with children of 
different ages or backgrounds? Finally, what other everyday experiences might drive the 
development of children’s epistemological understanding?  
Examining “Third Variables” 
A small but growing number of studies have indicated that there is a predictive 
relation between parents’ and children’s personal epistemology (Luce, Callanan, & 
Smilovic, 2013), as well as between parent epistemology and children’s critical thinking 
(Suárez & Koenig, in press). However, these studies do not examine possible third 
variables that could partially or completely account for the predictive relations observed. 
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In contrast, the current study provides insight into whether two likely candidates-- 
children’s verbal intelligence and executive functioning—may play a role. Moreover, the 
study examines demographics, parent authoritarianism and need for cognition as possible 
moderators or mediators in this relation. 
Individual differences in EU at Baseline. Children who tended to make more 
absolutist judgments were relatively young, had weaker EF skills, and had relatively 
absolutist and authoritarian parents. Furthermore, children with stronger executive 
functioning skills were particularly unlikely to hold absolutist beliefs in the Objective 
domain compared to children with weaker EF skills. This is in line with the idea that it is 
“easier” to have Absolutist beliefs about resolvable matters of fact, and that it takes more 
cognitive control to acknowledge the role of interpretation or opinion when considering 
these issues. likely to have absolutist beliefs if their parents also did so. Children who 
made more Multiplist judgments at baseline tended to be older and have less absolutist 
parents. Furthermore, these judgments were significantly less common in the Objective 
domain, and significantly more common in the Subjective domain. 
However, these findings also do not offer evidence of a moderating or mediating 
role of EF in the relation between parent and child absolutist epistemological 
understanding. This would suggest that although cognitive skills—specifically children’s 
executive functions—support children’s ability to depart from strict objectivism when 
they reason about the nature of knowledge, it does not explain observed relations between 
parents’ and children’s EU. Similarly, demographic factors—specifically parents’ 
educational attainment—predict children’s absolutist epistemology, but this does not 
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account for the link between parent and child EU.  
In sum, cognitive and socioeconomic factors may influence children’s EU, but 
they are not the reason why parents’ and children’s epistemological reasoning are similar. 
With that said, it remains to be seen if this would still be the case in a more 
socioeconomically diverse sample. Furthermore, in this context “weak” EF skills are 
those around the national average. It is unclear how EF skills may predict EU in more 
diverse samples. 
Individual differences in critical thinking. Children who were relatively well-
calibrated were significantly more likely to come from a household with very high 
educational attainment, have strong EF skills and, have relatively parents absolutist 
parents, and have parents with a particularly high need for cognition. This is perhaps 
unexpected given that this sample is less diverse than the general population both in 
terms of socioeconomic background and children’s cognitive skills. Because parents 
skewed highly educated and affluent, and children’s mean IQ and EF scores were ~1.5 
standard deviations above the national average, it is not possible to draw conclusions 
about how these factors relate to calibration in more diverse children. 
Children who preferred the Calibrator were generally older, had better executive 
functioning skills, and were also less absolutist across the three vignettes. Furthermore, 
their parents tended to be more multiplistic. Thus, children who reject strict objectivism, 
and whose parents are relatively inclined to focus on the subjective dimension of 
knowledge, were more likely deem a well-calibrated reasoner who is as having the “best 
way of thinking”, “knowing more”, and being more likeable compared to a consistently 
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overconfident speaker. Children who preferred the Overconfident speaker showed a 
reverse pattern of characteristics: they tended to be younger, have relatively poor 
executive functioning skills, have more absolutist beliefs, and their parents were less 
multiplistic.  
Finally, children who chose “both” speakers (and therefore had no preference for 
either) had a profile that somewhat resembled those who preferred the Calibrator, as well 
as those that preferred the Overconfident speaker. That is, like children who favored the 
Calibrator, their parents tended to be relatively multiplistic, focusing more on the 
subjective dimension of knowledge. However, like children who preferred the 
Overconfident speaker, they tended to have poor EF skills. Furthermore, their parents 
tended to have a lower need for cognition, or a tendency to enjoy engaging in effortful 
thinking and problem-solving. Perhaps unsurprisingly, their children also seemed less 
interested in epistemological problem-solving: children who preferred “both” speakers 
would go on to be less engaged during the epistemological intervention phase. That is, 
they were more likely to ignore or reject an experimenter’s attempts to support 
evaluativist reasoning about the nature of knowledge. 
 Together, these findings suggest that children’s ability to evaluate speakers on the 
basis of their reasoning about evidence is predicted by both cognitive skills and parent 
factors, namely children’s EF, parent multiplism, parent need for cognition, and child 
engagement. Therefore, although some of these “third variables” account for some of the 
variance in children’s critical thinking, and even moderate the effects of parent EU, 
parent epistemological beliefs still predict children’s learning preferences above and 
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beyond these factors. However, it should be noted again that we cannot generalize these 
findings to the larger population due to the relatively educated and affluent nature of this 
sample. 
Individual differences in sensitivity to intervention. Who benefitted from the 
intervention? A wide range of factors were predictive of children’s responsiveness to the 
intervention. In some cases, the intervention benefitted children who particularly needed 
it. For example, the children who enjoyed the most improvements in their 
epistemological sophistication were low in evaluativism to begin with, and overconfident 
in their predictions in the face of ambiguous evidence. After the intervention, children 
who were relatively uncalibrated at baseline were more likely to indicate that a Calibrator 
had “the best way of thinking”, “knows more”, and was more liked. Furthermore, 
younger children were more likely to show improvements in their calibration skills, as 
were children with more multiplistic parents. 
However, in other respects children with strong competencies were those who 
benefitted most. For instance, the children whose parents were more multiplistic did show 
significant improvement in their calibration, but this was especially true for those with 
outstanding executive functioning skills. Furthermore, children who were already 
relatively well-calibrated were more likely to show further improvements in this skill. 
Similarly, children who were already inclined to indicate that the Calibrator was the more 
competent reasoner became even more likely to do so after the intervention. Moreover, 
children who were both well-calibrated and had strong EF skills were also the most likely 
128 
 
to increase their preference for a well-calibrated reasoner. Thus, there are some ways in 
which the intervention helped “the rich get richer”. 
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Chapter 19: Implications and Future Directions 
Because children depend greatly on others to learn about the world around them, 
it is important that we understand the mechanisms by which they optimize their social 
learning. This study is significant because it provides important insights into children’s 
understanding of knowledge and reasoning, their developing ability to think critically 
about others’ testimony and behavior, and the specific ways in which the people in their 
lives may support the development of important critical thinking skills. Specifically, this 
work not only reinforces the existing idea that learners’ epistemological understanding 
has important implications for their critical thinking, but also adds to the existing 
literature in a number of important and exciting ways.  
First, it suggests that by age six children not only have an epistemological 
understanding, but also that it is far more flexible, sophisticated, and context-dependent 
than previously imagined (e.g. Kuhn et al., 2000; Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002). 
Furthermore, it suggests the predictive relation between parents’ and children’s EU is not 
simply explained by heritable cognitive factors like EF and IQ. Although executive 
functioning skills in particular appeared to be relevant to departing from absolutist 
thinking—especially regarding matters of resolvable fact—parent absolutist 
epistemology was a significant predictor of children’s EU above and beyond other factors 
observed. Along these lines, demographic diversity—which was rather limited in this 
sample—did not explain the large amount of observed variability in children’s or adults’ 
epistemological understanding. 
Notably, the study also addresses relations between young children’s critical 
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thinking and their own EU, which have not yet been directly measured and compared in 
any published research. Like studies before it, it suggests that children’s ability to 
evaluate speakers on the basis of their predictive reasoning skills is related to parent 
characteristics, including EU, authoritarianism, and need for cognition. However, it adds 
to this work by providing direct measures of children’s EU and revealing that children’s 
EU—their absolutist understanding in particular— is predictive of their learning 
preferences.  
More specifically, this work suggests that children who tend to focus more on the 
objective dimension of knowing, see knowledge as simple and certain, and consider 
claims to be simply correct or incorrect (absolutists) are much more likely to deem an 
unjustifiably confident reasoner as more competent than a well-calibrated one. Along 
these lines, children who tend to depart from absolutism—acknowledging the role of 
subjectivity or interpretation in the construction and justification of knowledge—are 
more likely to appreciate a speaker who adjusts the certainty of her predictions in 
correspondence with observed evidence. However, this work also suggests that other 
factors may also be at play, as parent multiplism and need for cognition were also 
predictive of children’s evaluations of reasoners. 
These results also raise a number of important questions about the nature of 
epistemological development, as well as future approaches to EU interventions. Study 
results indicate that dyadic interaction with an adult providing epistemological 
scaffolding has effects in real time on children’s ability to reason about the nature of 
knowledge, but much remains to be understood about how this works in more naturalistic 
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contexts, as well as in a more diverse range of children. This is particularly important 
when we consider that although the population studied is fairly diverse in terms of 
race/ethnicity, from a socioeconomic perspective they are more likely to receive quality 
STEM education and career opportunities than the average American child. Thus, it is 
important to investigate not only how best to implement highly personalized and 
developmentally appropriate interventions for epistemological development, but to do so 
in a culturally competent manner for those who would benefit most. 
Finally, this work illustrates the importance of considering not just normative 
trends, but individual differences in development. Even in a rather homogenous sample 
and within a narrow age range, we found an immense amount of variability in how 
children (and their parents) understand the nature of knowledge and use it to think 
critically about reasoners’. Thus, I would argue that if we aim to truly understand the 
development of social learning, we must commit to study both general mechanisms and 
individual differences. Indeed, the study of individual differences can inform our 
understanding of general mechanisms of development, allowing us to develop theoretical 
frameworks that capture the complexity and nuance of studied phenomena.   
Like children, the individual differences we study are themselves complex, 
contextually-dependent, and developing systems. Based on these perspectives, I would 
offer a series of recommendations for those interested in understanding individual 
variation in children’s learning. The study of individual differences shouldn’t simply 
consist of comparing group means (e.g. boys vs. girls). Instead, individual differences are 
best understood by also examining (1) within-group variability; (2) individual variability 
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across contexts (e.g. home, school, etc.); (3) covariation with other factors (e.g. 
demographics, parenting styles); (4) processes underlying variations in learning (e.g. 
approaching testimonial learning using low-level cues vs. mentalizing about sources); 
and (5) mechanisms and contexts by which these variations may emerge and develop 
(e.g. media consumption, dyadic interactions with parents, ToM development). 
Along these lines, I would argue that achieving a complete and nuanced 
understanding of the optimal conditions for learning requires a consideration of fit 
between a learner and their learning context. Rather than operate from the assumption 
that there is one set of ways to promote adaptive learning outcomes, current findings 
indicate that “optimal conditions” for social learning will likely vary not only as a 
function of age, but also family background, socioeconomic status, goals, and an 
individual learners’ idiosyncratic constellation of cognitive skills and affective factors. 
One approach to move our theoretical understanding of epistemological 
development and social learning forward involves the mending of existing fractures in the 
study of epistemological understanding, both within and across the fields of 
developmental and educational psychology. One idea that has proven generative in 
educational psychology is that of “conceptual ecology”, a term originally meant to 
describe conceptual change in cold Darwinian terms, where only the “fittest” ideas 
survive (Posner et al., 1982). With the onset of a “warming” trend in conceptual change 
research, now the term refers to learners’ idiosyncratic collections of (mis)conceptions, 
motivations, emotions, reasoning processes, identity, and values. By situating learning 
within this complex and dynamic environment, researchers are better able to understand 
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the variability in (mis)conceptions about physics, evolution, climate change, and more 
(Greene, et al, 2017; Sinatra et al, 2008). For example, this lens has offered insight into 
the backfire effect—or the ironic strengthening of misconceptions after an attempted 
refutation—suggesting that when misconceptions are tied to an aspect of a learners’ 
identity, the negative emotions stirred by refutations inhibit conceptual change (Trevors, 
et al., 2016).  
In the developmental literature, theories of learning often focus on general 
empiricist or sociocultural processes without detailing how (or if) “warmer” factors like 
affect or motivation are involved (e.g. rational constructivism, Xu, 2012; “theory theory”, 
Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; sociocultural theory, Miller, 2002). In contrast, educational 
psychology’s existing models of learning and critical thinking are inconsistent in the 
extent to which they address mechanisms of development and sources of individual 
variation, particularly for young children. Moving forward, it may be helpful for 
developmentalists to conceptualize early social learning as contextualized within a child’s 
developing conceptual ecology. 
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Appendix 
Vignettes 
Objective Vignettes 
Piano story: Karen and Debra are talking about the history of pianos. Karen says: 
“Pianos were invented 200 years ago.” Debra says: “No, pianos were invented more than 
300 years ago.” 
Weather story: Richard and Gary are hoping to have a picnic outside. They look 
out the window to see what the weather is like. Richard says: “Look, it is dark and 
raining outside! We can’t go on our picnic.” Gary says: “No, it is bright and sunny 
outside! We can go on our picnic.” 
Wedding story: Greg and Nate are talking about their grandparents’ wedding. 
Greg says: Grandma and Grampa got married in the month of July. Nate says: No, 
Grandma and Grampa got married in the month of February. 
 
Integrated Vignettes 
Jujus story: Lisa and Deb are at the zoo. They come to a cage with an animal 
they’ve never seen before. The sign says it’s a baby juju from Australia. Lisa says, “jujus 
would make good pets”. Deb says, “no, jujus would make bad pets”. 
Coach story: Edward and Dennis are talking about their coach. Edward says: 
“Our coach is nice”. Dennis says: “No, our coach is mean.” 
Basketball story: Randy and Scott are talking about basketball. Randy says to 
Scott: “I think that the Buford Banana Slugs are a bad basketball team!” Scott says: “No, 
I think that the Buford Banana Slugs are a good basketball team!” 
 
Subjective Vignettes 
Painting story: Frank and Raymond are looking at paintings at the art fair. Frank 
says: “This painting is ugly.” Raymond says, “No, this painting is pretty.” 
Board game story: Roy and Barry are playing a board game called “Gardylog”. 
Roy says: “This game is very boring.” Barry says: “No, this game is very fun.” 
Movie story: Dorothy and Joan are talking about the movie they just saw. 
Dorothy says: “That movie was so great!” Joan says: “No, that movie was terrible!” 
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Vignette Questions 
* Question only asked during intervention phase 
  
*Do we know whether [x]? 
*Do they agree or disagree about [x]? 
Why do they disagree about [x]? 
*Could they disagree because they know different things? 
*Could they disagree because they like different things]? 
Does it make sense to disagree about [x]? 
How come? 
Does anyone here need help figuring out [x]? 
Might someone need more help than other?  
What can they do to figure it out? 
If they did that, would they know for sure about [x]? 
Does someone have to be wrong here, or could they both be right? 
If they can both be right, could one be more right than the other or not really? 
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Calibration Video Scripts 
 
Familiarization Phase 
 
50% Activation 
Caroline, Brittany and Taylor are sitting at a table.  Caroline is in the middle with the 
blicket detector in front of her; Brittany and Taylor sit at either side (counterbalanced 
between subjects). 
 
Caroline: Look at these blocks! [Pulls out 4 blocks from set A and counts them].  One, 
two, three, four.   Have you ever seen these blocks before? [Taylor and Brittany indicate 
“no”]. 
Pay attention to what happens I put them on this box, because I’m going to ask you 
questions later.  [Places each block separately on the toy in a slow, deliberate fashion. 
Only the 2nd and 3rd block appears to make the box light up].  Two of these made the toy 
go! 
 
Caroline puts the blocks aside (still visible) and takes out a new one from the same set, 
holding it up and making eye contact with the camera. 
Caroline:  See this block?  Will this one make the toy light up? 
 
 [Calibrator]:  Maybe.  I’m not so sure this will make the toy light up. 
 [Overconfident]:  Yes.  I’m very sure this will make the toy light up. 
 
 
75% Activation 
Caroline, Brittany and Taylor are sitting at a table.  Caroline is in the middle with the 
blicket detector in front of her; Brittany and Taylor sit at either side (counterbalanced 
between subjects). 
 
Caroline: Look at these blocks! [Pulls out 4 blocks from set B and counts them].  One, 
two, three, four.   Have you ever seen these blocks before? [Taylor and Brittany indicate 
“no”]. 
Pay attention to what happens I put them on this box, because I’m going to ask you 
questions later.  [Places each block separately on the toy in a slow, deliberate fashion. 
Only the 3rd block does not appear to make the box light up].  Three of these blocks made 
the toy go! 
 
Caroline puts the blocks aside (still visible) and takes out a new one from the same set, 
holding it up and making eye contact with the camera. 
Caroline:  See this block?  Will this one make the toy light up? 
 
 [Calibrator]:  Maybe.  I’m kinda sure this will make the toy light up. 
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 [Overconfident]:  Yes.  I’m very sure this will make the toy light up. 
 
100% Activation 
Caroline, Brittany and Taylor are sitting at a table.  Caroline is in the middle with the 
blicket detector in front of her; Brittany and Taylor sit at either side (counterbalanced 
between subjects). 
 
Caroline: Look at these blocks! [Pulls out 4 blocks from set B and counts them].  One, 
two, three, four.  Have you ever seen these blocks before? [Taylor and Brittany indicate 
“no”]. 
Pay attention to what happens I put them on this box, because I’m going to ask you 
questions later.  [Places each block separately on the toy in a slow, deliberate fashion. 
All the blocks appear to make the box light up].  All of these blocks made the toy go! 
 
Caroline puts the blocks aside (still visible) and takes out a new one from the same set, 
holding it up and making eye contact with the camera. 
Caroline:  See this block?  Will this one make the toy light up? 
 
 [Calibrator]:  Yes.  I’m very sure this will make the toy light up. 
 [Overconfident]:  Yes.  I’m very sure this will make the toy light up. 
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Calibration Phase Questions 
 
Within each trial 
 
After Caroline demonstrates:  How many blocks made the box light up? 
After Caroline prompts prediction: So, what do you think? How sure are you that it 
will make the box light up: [point to scale] very sure, kinda sure, or not so sure? 
After [Calibrator] makes a prediction: What did [Calibrator] say about the block? 
After [Overconfident] makes a prediction: What did [Overconfident] say about the 
block? 
After memory checks: Who do you think has the best way of thinking, [Calibrator], 
[Overconfident], or both? 
 
After all 3 trials 
 
Knowledge Question: Who knows more, [Calibrator] or [Overconfident]? 
Preference Question: Who do you like more, [Calibrator] or  [Overconfident]? 
 
 
Certainty scale:  
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Demographic Survey 
Dear Parents, 
Your answers will be kept completely confidential, and will not be identified with 
your name in our records.  We will not use this information for any purpose for our other 
than our own studies. If you prefer not to answer these questions, please check the space 
below (or skip the questions you’d rather not answer). 
    I prefer not to answer these questions. 
I would identify my child’s sex as: 
   Male    Female 
I would identify my child’s ethnicity as: 
   Hispanic or Latino   Non-Hispanic 
I would identify my child’s race as: 
   American Indian/ Alaska Native 
   Asian 
   Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
   Black or African American 
   White 
   Other:        
Parent/ Guardian 1 Occupation:       
Parent/ Guardian 2 Occupation:        
Highest educational level (Indicate with “1” for Parent/ Guardian 1; with “2” for 
Parent/Guardian 2): 
   Before high school diploma 
   High school Diploma 
   Some College 
   Associate Degree (for example: AA, AS) 
  Bachelor’s Degree (for example: BA, AB, BS) 
  Master’s Degree (for example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA) 
  Doctorate Degree (for example: PhD, EdD) 
What is your total household income? 
  Less than $19,999     ______$20,000 - $49,999      ______$50,000 - 
$79,999      ______$80,000 - $99,999 
______$100,000 - $139,999   ______$140,000 - $179,999  ______$180,000 - 
$249,999  ______$250,000 or more 
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Authoritarianism 
 
Authoritarianism (1 = high authoritarian response; 0 = low authoritarian response) 
: 
Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every 
person thinks that some are more important than others. Following are pairs of desirable 
qualities. Please circle the one you think is more important for a child to have. 
 
1.     INDEPENDENCE                 or           RESPECT FOR ELDERS 
2.     CURIOSITY                          or           GOOD MANNERS 
3.     OBEDIENCE                        or            SELF-RELIANCE 
4.     BEING CONSIDERATE      or           WELL BEHAVED 
1a. 0,1 
2a. 0,1 
3a. 1,0 
4a. 0,1 
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Social Conformity 
 
Social-conformity values (1 = high value for social conformity; 0=low value 
for social conformity): 
Next, for each of the following questions please indicate which of the two statements 
YOU most agree with by circling the corresponding letter (A or B): 
 
1b.         A. It’s best for everyone if people try to ﬁt in instead of acting in unusual 
ways.  (=1) 
B. People should be encouraged to express themselves in unique and possibly unusual 
ways. (=0) 
 
2b.         A. Obeying the rules and ﬁtting in are signs of a strong and healthy society. (=1) 
B. People who continually emphasize the need for unity will only limit creativity and hurt 
our society. (=0) 
 
3b.         A. We should admire people who go their own way without worrying about what 
others think. (=0) 
B. People need to learn to ﬁt in and get along with others. (=1) 
 
4b.         A. It is most important to give people all the freedom they need to express 
themselves. (=0) 
B. Our society will break down if we allow people to do or say anything they want.  (=1) 
 
5.         A. Society is always on the verge of disorder and lawlessness and only strict laws 
can prevent it. (=1) 
B. It is more important to give people control over their lives than to create additional 
laws and regulations. (=0) 
 
6.         A. People can only develop their true potential in a fully permissive society.  (=0) 
B. If we give people too much freedom there will just be more and more disorder in 
society. (=1) 
 
7.         A. Rules are there for people to follow, not to change. (=1) 
B. Society’s basic rules were created by people and so can always be changed by people. 
(=0) 
 
8.         A. People should not try to understand how society works but just accept the way 
it is.  (=1) 
B. People should constantly try to question why things are the way they are.  (=0) 
 
9.         A. People should be guided more by their feelings and less by the rules.   (=0) 
B. The only way to stay out of trouble is to respect the established rules of society.  (=1) 
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10.       A. People should be given the opportunity to hear all sides of a question, 
regardless of how controversial it is. (=0) 
B. If we cannot achieve agreement on our values we will never be able to keep this 
society together.  (=1) 
 
11.       A. In the long run our cultural and ideological differences will make us a 
healthier, more creative, and stronger society.  (=0) 
B. It is unlikely that this country will survive in the long run unless we can overcome our 
differences and disagreements. (=1) 
 
12.       A. Society should aim to protect citizens’ right to live any way they choose.   (=0) 
B. It is important to enforce the community’s standards of right and wrong.  (=1) 
 
13.       A. Students must be encouraged to question established authorities and criticize 
the customs and traditions of society.  (=0) 
B. One of the major aims of education should be to give students a few simple rules of 
behavior to make them better citizens.  (=1) 
 
14.       A. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas but as they grow up they ought 
get over them and settle down. (=1) 
B. If some people don’t occasionally come up with rebellious ideas there would be less 
progress in the world. (=0) 
 
15.       A. It may well be that children who talk back to their parents respect them more in 
the long run. (=0) 
B. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should 
learn.  (=1) 
 
16.       A. Children should be taught to do what is right even though they may not always 
feel like it.  (=1) 
B. Children should be encouraged to express themselves even though parents may not 
always like it. (=0) 
 
17.       A. The most important values children should learn are love and respect for their 
parents.  (=1) 
B. The most important values children should learn are independence and self-
reliance.  (=0) 
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Short Form of the Need for Cognition Scale 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) 
 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the 
statement is characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you 
(not at all like you) please write a "1" to the left of the question; if the statement is 
extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) please write a "5" next to the 
question. Of course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely 
characteristic of you; if so, please use the number in the middle of the scale that describes 
the best fit. Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements 
below: 1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain; 4 = 
somewhat characteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic.  
 
____1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
____2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
____3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. a 
____4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure 
to challenge my thinking abilities? 
____5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to 
think in-depth about something." 
____6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
____7. I only think as hard as 1 have to. a 
____8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones? 
____9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them? 
____10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
____1 I. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
____12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much? 
____13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
____14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
____15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
____16. 1 feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort? 
____17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it 
works? 
____18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
Note. From "'The Efficient Assessment of Need for Cognition," by J. T. Cacioppo, R. E. Petty, and C. F. 
Kao, 1984, Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, pp. 306-307.  
a Reverse scored.
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Epistemic Thinking Questionnaire (Barzilai & Weinstock, 2015) 
 
Please read the following scenarios and choose the answer that best matches your views. 
 
History Scenario: The Fifth Livian War 
North and South Livia are two small countries that existed in the nineteenth 
century in Central Asia. During the latter part of the century there were a series of 
conflicts between the two countries, termed the Livian wars. The following are two brief 
accounts of the Fifth Livian war, which took place in 1878. These accounts are based on 
actual historical events. 
 
A brief account of the Fifth Livian war by J. Abman, expert historian of the Livian 
wars 
In recent years a large collection of important documents from the period of the 
Fifth Livian war was found. On July 19th 1878, during a period set aside by North Livia 
to honor one of their national leaders, the ceremonies were interrupted by a sneak attack 
from the South Livians, beginning the Fifth Livian war. Because the North Livians were 
caught by surprise, they were unprepared at first and the South Livians won a few early 
battles. But then the tide turned heavily in favor the North Livians. Before the North 
Livians could reach a final victory, however, a neighboring large country intervened to 
prevent further bloodshed. Despite their early setbacks, the later sweeping victories of the 
North Livians showed that they would have won had the fighting continued.  
 
A brief account of the Fifth Livian war by N. Ivan, expert historian of the Livian 
wars 
The discovery of new historical documents that have never been published is 
shedding a new light on the events of the Fifth Livian war. In the Fourth Livian war, 
North Livia had beaten South Livia, taken some of its land, and refused to leave. South 
Livia could no longer tolerate this situation and spent large sums of public funds to 
strengthen its military defenses. On July 20th 1878, the Fifth Livian war began. The war 
took place with rapid, dramatic victories for South Livia, resulting in great national 
celebration. After these dramatic victories, the South Livians suffered some minor losses. 
But then a neighboring large country intervened to prevent further bloodshed. Despite 
their later setback, the final victory of South Livia seemed assured because of its overall 
position of strength.  
 
1. Is there an answer to the question of what happened in the Fifth Livian War? 
a. Eventually there will be one right answer.  
b. In principle, it is impossible to know the right answer 
c. There may be multiple right answers but they are not equally right. 
 
2. Can there be certainty about the Fifth Livian War? 
a. Eventually one could know for certain. 
b. One could never know for certain because it is impossible to find out what 
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happened. 
c. There is never full certainty, but it is possible to improve the degree of 
certainty. 
 
3. Is it possible to find out the truth about the Fifth Livian War?  
a. With further investigation we would find out that there is one truth about 
the Fifth Livian War. 
b. With further investigation we would find out that truth is in the eyes of the 
beholder. 
c. With further investigation we would find out that there is more than one 
truth but that there are different degrees of truth. 
 
4. Is there truth about the Fifth Livian War? 
a. There is truth. If it is not known it is important to find it out. 
b. There is no single truth and therefore there is no point in seeking the truth. 
c. Truth can have many interpretations but some interpretations are better than 
others. 
 
5. What should the knowledge about the Fifth Livian War be based on? 
a. Only on the facts. 
b. Mainly on personal points of view. 
c. Mainly on interpretations of data. 
 
6. What should the knowledge about the Fifth Livian War include? 
a. Only detailed data about the topic. 
b. Mainly people’s opinions about the topic. 
c. Mainly theories that explain the topic. 
 
7. What should be the source of knowledge of those who study the Fifth Livian War? 
a. The source of knowledge should be only in evidence that can be gathered. 
b. The source of knowledge should be mainly in peoples’ opinions and ideas. 
c. The source of knowledge should be mainly in how people interpret the evidence 
that was gathered. 
 
8. Does the answer to the Fifth Livian War depend on perspectives?  
a. No. One should think about the Fifth Livian War without being influenced by 
personal perspectives. 
b. Yes. The answer to the question depends on personal perspectives. 
c. Yes. But by considering multiple perspectives one can form a balanced position. 
 
9. How should one evaluate explanations about the Fifth Livian War? 
a. The most important thing is to check if the explanation reports exact data and not 
opinions. 
b. The most important thing is to check if the explanation matches the reader’s view 
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of the topic. 
c. The most important thing is to check if the explanation helps improve 
understanding of what is known about the topic. 
 
10. What is the best way to judge different accounts about the Fifth Livian War? 
a. The best way is to check if the account is based only on the facts. 
b. The best way is to check which account is most reasonable according to the 
reader’s worldview. 
c. The best way is to check which interpretation best explains the available data. 
 
11. What would a reliable explanation be regarding the Fifth Livian War? 
a. A reliable explanation is one that includes detailed information without opinions 
mixed in. 
b. A reliable explanation is one that makes sense according to the reader’s personal 
knowledge. 
c. A reliable explanation is one that is based on a theory that explains the 
phenomena.  
 
 
Biology Scenario: Deformed Frogs 
Across North America frogs are being found that have major physical deformities. 
Some frogs have deformed eyes. Others have misshapen or multiple legs-- or they are 
missing their legs altogether. The following are two brief accounts of why the frogs are 
being deformed.  
 
A brief account of why the frogs are being deformed, by G. Agmon, biologist 
investigating the frogs. 
North American frogs have been found with deformed legs. The deformed frogs 
have cysts in the area from which their legs develop. These cysts are caused by parasites. 
The parasites enter the tadpole early in its development and burrow into the area from 
which their legs develop. In order to test whether the parasites cause the deformities in 
the frogs, an experiment was conducted in which small plastic beads were surgically 
implanted into tadpoles in the location where cysts were observed in adult frogs – in the 
area of the body from which legs develop. Many of the frogs that developed from these 
tadpoles had multiple legs and feet coming out of the area in which the plastic bead was 
implanted. Therefore, parasites in the water are causing these deformities in the frogs. 
 
A brief account of why the frogs are being deformed by M. Moyal, biologist 
investigating the frogs. 
In recent years, North American frogs have been found with deformed legs and 
eyes. Chemicals in the water are causing deformities in the North American frogs. The 
chemicals in the water come in contact with the tadpoles while they are developing, and 
this contact causes a reaction that interferes with normal development. In order to test 
whether the suspected chemical was in the water, a sample of water from the area where 
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the frogs live was taken. A lab test revealed that the suspected chemical was indeed found 
in the water. In order to test whether this chemical can cause the observed deformities, 
the chemical was applied to normal tadpoles, and the frogs that developed had 
deformities similar to those observed in the North American frogs. Therefore, chemicals 
in the water are causing the deformities in the frogs. 
1. Is there an answer to the question of what happened in the deformed frogs? 
a. Eventually there will be one right answer.  
b. In principle, it is impossible to know the right answer 
c. There may be multiple right answers but they are not equally right. 
 
2. Can there be certainty about the deformed frogs? 
a. Eventually one could know for certain. 
b. One could never know for certain because it is impossible to find out what 
happened. 
c. There is never full certainty, but it is possible to improve the degree of 
certainty. 
 
3. Is it possible to find out the truth about the deformed frogs?  
a. With further investigation we would find out that there is one truth about 
the deformed frogs. 
b. With further investigation we would find out that truth is in the eyes of the 
beholder. 
c. With further investigation we would find out that there is more than one 
truth but that there are different degrees of truth. 
 
4. Is there truth about the deformed frogs? 
a. There is truth. If it is not known it is important to find it out. 
b. There is no single truth and therefore there is no point in seeking the truth. 
c. Truth can have many interpretations but some interpretations are better than 
others. 
 
5. What should the knowledge about the deformed frogs be based on? 
a. Only on the facts. 
b. Mainly on personal points of view. 
c. Mainly on interpretations of data. 
 
6. What should the knowledge about the deformed frogs include? 
a. Only detailed data about the topic. 
b. Mainly people’s opinions about the topic. 
c. Mainly theories that explain the topic. 
 
7. What should be the source of knowledge of those who study the deformed frogs? 
a. The source of knowledge should be only in evidence that can be gathered. 
b. The source of knowledge should be mainly in peoples’ opinions and ideas. 
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c. The source of knowledge should be mainly in how people interpret the evidence 
that was gathered. 
 
8. Does the answer to the deformed frogs depend on perspectives?  
a. No. One should think about the deformed frogs without being influenced by 
personal perspectives. 
b. Yes. The answer to the question depends on personal perspectives. 
c. Yes. But by considering multiple perspectives one can form a balanced position. 
 
9. How should one evaluate explanations about the deformed frogs? 
a. The most important thing is to check if the explanation reports exact data and not 
opinions. 
b. The most important thing is to check if the explanation matches the reader’s view 
of the topic. 
c. The most important thing is to check if the explanation helps improve 
understanding of what is known about the topic. 
 
10. What is the best way to judge different accounts about the deformed frogs? 
a. The best way is to check if the account is based only on the facts. 
b. The best way is to check which account is most reasonable according to the 
reader’s worldview. 
c. The best way is to check which interpretation best explains the available data. 
 
11. What would a reliable explanation be regarding the deformed frogs? 
a. A reliable explanation is one that includes detailed information without opinions 
mixed in. 
b. A reliable explanation is one that makes sense according to the reader’s personal 
knowledge. 
c. A reliable explanation is one that is based on a theory that explains the 
phenomena.  
